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PARTIES TO APPEAL 
All parties to this appeal are listed in the caption. 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. STANDARDS OF REVIEW, 
AND PRESERVATION BELOW 
Issue 1: Did the district court err in granting summary judgment dismissing 
appellants Willis Lauritz Petersen, Jr., Leslee P. Christensen, Allan D. Petersen, Kristine 
Petersen Smith, and Dean B. Petersen, as trustees of the Margaret Park Petersen Family 
Living Trust's ("Petersen Family") Petition for Judicial Review of a Land Use Decision 
because the court did not apply the correct standard of review or misapplied the standard of 
review, including the following: 
A. Given the text of the Municipal Land Use Development Management Act 
("LUDMA") and the due process and equal protection rights afforded by the 
state and federal constitutions, what is the correct standard of judicial review 
of a the denial by a municipality of a an application to rezone one parcel of 
land? 
B. Is the denial by Riverton City of the Petersen Family' application to re2one 
one parcel of property a legislative decision afforded broad legislative 
discretion or is such a decision a quasi- judicial decision subject to a higher 
standard of review? 
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C. Does the reasonable debatable standard, codified in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-
801 (3) (b), require some record evidence supporting the Riverton City's denial 
of the Petersen Family's application to rezone one parcel or property? 
D. Does the reasonably debatable criteria set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-
801 (3)(b) and § 10-9a-102 violate due process because it is so vague that it 
does not constitute any standard of review at all? 
Preservation in District Court: Petitioners' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Riverton City's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 320-25); oral argument on Respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 446). 
Standard of Review: Summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Machock v. 
Fink, 2006 UT 30 ^8, 137 P.3d 779. The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law 
reviewed for correctness. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Automated Geographic "Reference Ctr., 2008 
UT 88^13, 200 P.3d 643, 649. 
Whether a statute is facially constitutional is a question of law. Grand County v. Emery 
County, 2002 UT 57 % 6, 52 P.3d 1148. 
Issue 2: Did the district court err in granting summary judgment in favor of 
Riverton City even though the record evidence shows that the decision was illegal because it 
was made by the same decisions makers who were seeking to buy part of the Peterson 
Family's land at issue and denied the Petersen Family equal protection and substantive and 
procedural due process? 
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Preservation in District Court: Petitioners' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Riverton City's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 320-28); oral argument on Respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 446). 
Standard of Review: Summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Machock v. 
Fink, 2006 UT 30 ^8, 137 P.3d 779. Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law, 
which is reviewed for correctness. Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 57 j^6, 52 P.3d 
1148. 
Whether a governmental entity has acted unconstitutionally is subject to a de novo 
standard of review. State v. Bargee, 2007 UT 95 ^]35, 177 P.3d 48. 
Issue 3: Did the district court err in denying the Petersen Family's request under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). 
Preservation in District Court: Motion for Continuance Pursuant to Rule 56(f) and 
Rule 56(f) Affidavit of Dale R Gardiner (R. 288-298). 
Standard of Review: A denial of a Rule 56(f) Motion is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Salt Lake County v. W. Dairymen Coop,, 2002 UT 39 \\<d, 48 P.3d 910. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-102(l) 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(8)(a)(i). 
United States Const, amend. 14, § 1 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 
Utah Const, art. I, § 24 
Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16, 70 P.3d 47. The Petersen Family contends that 
Bradley should be overturned based, in part, on Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-701(3)(a)(i) (2005). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) 
Riverton City Zoning Ordinance 12-200-005 
Riverton City Zoning Ordinance 12-200-010 
Copies of the Determinative provision are attached as Exhibit A in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment affirming Riverton City's denial of the 
Petersen Family's application ("Application") to rezone a 20.84-acre parcel of land 
("Property"). In the Application, the Petersen Family sought a change in the zoning of their 
land from one-half acre lots to one-third acre lots; the same zoning granted to property 
across the street, on the same day that the City denied the Petersen Family's Application. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The Petersen Family's request was for their property to be rezoned to the same 
zoning that had been granted to all recent rezone requests in the applicable municipal 
planning area. Even though granting the Petersen Family's rezone request was supported by 
the City's General Plan and the requested rezoning would have no adverse impact on traffic 
or the surrounding neighborhood, the Riverton City Planning Commission ("Planning 
Commission") recommended a denial of the request. The only stated basis for the 
recommendation to deny the Petersen Family's request was the Planning Commission's 
mistaken legal conclusion that to grant the request would constitute illegal spot zoning. 
At the time the Planning Commission recommended that the Petersen Family's 
rezoning request be denied, it knew that the City was negotiating with the Petersen Family to 
purchase part of the parcel at issue for a park and/or flood control basin. The Planning 
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Commission knew that land zoned for one-third acre lots is worth more than land zoned for 
one-half acre lots. 
After the Planning Commission's recommendation to deny to the Petersen Family' 
rezoning request, the Riverton City Council ("City Council") held a hearing on the request. 
The City Council was never informed as to the reason for the Planning Commission's 
recommendation to deny the request and the City Council was not informed that the Mayor 
and other City officials and employees had previously promised that the rezoning request 
would be granted. The City Council was aware, however, that the City was attempting to 
purchase a portion of the property for a park and or flood control basin. 
The Peterson Family filed this case in August 2007 as a Petition for Judicial Review 
of a Land Use Decision ("Petition"). On appeal, the Petersen Family seeks review of 
Riverton City's denial of the Petersen Family's application to rezone its property from R-22 
(one-half acre lots) to R-3 (one-third acre lots) 
C. Disposition Below 
On December 29, 2008, the district court entered Summary Judgment and Order of 
Dismissal by applying the following judicial standard of review: 
[T]he Court notes that it has a very limited role in reviewing this 
challenge to the exercise of legislative discretion by the Riverton 
City Council on a petition for review which is subject to the 
highly deferential, reasonably debatable standard. The Court 
can only consider the record of proceedings before the City 
which has been provided by the City pursuant to section 10-9a-
801, and it is not appropriate to permit discovery under these 
facts and circumstances. (R . 422-431.) 
This appeal followed on Jan. 26, 2009 (R. 433-435). 
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D. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review 
1. The Petersen Family owns a 20.84-acre parcel of property at 12175 South 
3600 West in Riverton, Utah (the "Property"). (R. 2.) 
2. In 2007, the Petersen Family entered into a written contract with D.R. 
Horton, Inc. ("D.R. Horton") for the sale of the Property for $5.5 million. Closing and 
payment were contingent upon D.R. Horton obtaining final subdivision approval for a 
development acceptable to it. (R. 3.) 
3. The Riverton City General Plan ("General Plan"), dated February 28, 2006, 
designates the Property as R-3 or low density residential zoning, which permits one-third 
acre lots. (R. 3.) 
4. In May of 2007, D.R. Horton, on behalf of the Petersen Family, submitted the 
Application to rezone the Property from RR-22 (one-half acre lots) to R-3 (one-third acre 
lots), application number PLC-07-4009. (R. 3.) 
5. No one-half acre residential subdivision lots are currently being developed in 
Riverton. In the last three years, only two residential subdivisions with one-half acre or 
larger lots have been approved by the Riverton City Council. These two subdivisions are in 
a municipal planning subarea different than the planning area containing the Property at 
issue. AD other developments have included one-third acre, one-quarter acre, or smaller lots. 
(R. 3.) 
6. The Property is located in planning subarea 2 of the planning subareas within 
the Riverton City General Plan. Three different zoning areas are located in planning subarea 
2: R-l, which permits the construction of residences on one acre lots, R-3, which permits 
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the construction of residences on one-third acre lots, and R-4, which permits construction of 
residences on one-quarter acre lots. (R. 300, 334, See R. 10) 
7. In recent years under Riverton City's General Plan, one-third acre or smaller 
lots are commonplace throughout planning subarea 2. The subdivision with one-acre lots in 
planning subarea 2 was built in the 1960s. (R. 8, 10, 301) 
8. The overall unit density for planning subarea 2 is 2.8 development units 
"du"s/Acre. In other words, Riverton City's General Plan calls for, on average, 2.8 
residences per acre in panning subarea 2 where the Property is located. (R. 301, 334) 
9. The Riverton City General Plan establishes that only five of the fourteen 
Planning Subareas in Riverton City average less than 3.0 development units/acre or 
residences per acre. Two of those five parcels are zoned for commercial developments. 
Only three areas in the General Plan of the entire City of Riverton have densities less than 
3.0 du/Acre. The density for these areas, however, is much higher than the number 
reflected on Riverton City's General Plan because the labeled density does not reflect the 
percentage of land dedicated to roads and sidewalks. (R. 301, 334, See R. 8). 
10. Riverton City's subdivision ordinance provides that the requirements of the 
General Plan are mandatory. (R. 304). The General Plan designates the property in the 
planning subarea at issue as medium residential. See General Plan - Planning Subareas. (R. 
333, 334) The Land Use General Plan Maps and Zoning Map are attached as Exhibit B in 
the Addendum. 
11. On June 14, 2007, the Planning Commission convened and held a public 
hearing on the Petersen Family's Application. The Planning Commission observed that 
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rezoning the Property from RR-22 to R-3 complies with the General Plan and that the 
Property has sufficient access to accommodate R-3 development. (R. 303). The transcript 
of the Riverton City Planning Commission hearing is attached at Exhibit "C." (R. 337-364) 
12. Consistent with the City's promise to grant the Petersen Family's Application, 
the planning commission staff explained that the City was "facilitating" the rezone 
application. It was explained that the difference between one acre, one-half acre and-one 
third acre lot zoning was that one-acre zoning allows large animals: 
PLANNER AAGARD: |T)his application has been initiated by D.R. Horton 
[on behalf of the property owner] and not by Riverton City. But we are facilitating 
this application for them. ***. The purposes of both zones are single family 
residential uses. The main differences between the two zones are as follows: The 
RR-22 and R-l zone allow large animals as a permitted use. The R-3 zone does not. 
The lot sizes of the RR-22 and R-l zones are one and one-half acre. And the R-3 
zone allows a minimum of 14,000 or a third-acre lot. 
Riverton City ordinances do have buffering measures where property zoned 
for animals are adjacent to property not zoned for animals. If the rezoned R-3 is 
approved by the Planning Commission and the City Council, those measures will be 
dealt with as part of the subdivision approval. This application is to discuss only the 
appropriateness of the property being zoned R-3 verses RR-22. 
(R. 303) 
13. The Staff then explained that the application complied with the City's General 
Plan, but it was not explained that pursuant to the City's Subdivision ordinance, the General 
Plan's provisions are mandatory: 
This is an image of the City's General Plan. Riverton City - or 
the rezone request does comply with the City's General Plan. 
(R. 303 emphasis added) 
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14. Next, the City Planner improperly injected the issue of the City's anticipated 
purchase of a portion of the parcel at issue followed by a "horse is out of the barn" 
instruction to the Planning Commission to disregard the issue: 
There is a separate issue regarding the eastern end of the subject 
property. Riverton City has been working to acquire property in that 
location for a storm water management facility from the property 
owner, and recentiy the Applicant. Property acquisition and price 
negotiations are not the responsibility of the Planning Commission to 
consider and therefore should not be relevant to this zoning request. 
(R. 303 emphasis added) 
15. The Staff ended its presentation by recommending approval: 
There is access to Janice Drive on the north and the south of 
the subject property. As well as access to 3600 West. 
Because the rezone request of the R-3 zone does comply with 
the City's General Plan and sufficient [animal] buffering 
measures exist under City ordinances, the staff is recommending 
approval to the request to rezone to R-3. 
(R. 303 emphasis added) 
16. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the public discussion then focused on the 
City's prospective purchase: 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Thank you. 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: So Andy, in this case, is "C" the 
storm water management facility that's being brought or -
PLANNER AAGARD: Yeah. That's an area that is being 
negotiated for that purpose. 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: What are "B" and "A"? 
PLANNER AAGARD: I believe they'll be part of it. I'm not 
sure why they — 
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UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Part of the storm water 
management facility? 
(R. 303 emphasis added) 
17. During the public comment portion of the meeting, the Planner explained that 
those who had animals would still have the right to raise animals: 
That means if you change the zoning, but you've been keeping 
horses on your land that entire time, you can go right on 
keeping those horses on your land, regardless of how the rezone 
occurs. The more common term for that is you're 
"grandfathered" in. Any you would continue to be able to have 
that right to keep animals on that land so* long as you 
continuously do so and don't abandon that use for a period of 
time. Usually it's a year. 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: What he's talking about is 
people who are actually on R-22s, not the rezone area. 
PLANNER AAGARD: Right. I understand that. So as I 
understand the Applicant's question is, would the people who 
do have animal use rights run in danger of losing them pursuant 
to unforeseen complaints brought by people who are neighbors 
to there, who don't have animal rights. And the shortest reply 
is only if a rezone occurs. 
And I would just like to add that even if a rezone occurs that 
takes away the animal use rights on paper, you still have the 
right to use that land as legal non-conforming use right. 
PLANNER AAGARD: And I would also say - I would also 
add that it's highly unusual. And in fact, in ten years of doing 
this, I've never seen an instance where a property's animal use 
rights have been taken away as a result of complaints levied by 
late-coming neighbors. Never seen that happen. World 
changes, but never seen that happen. 
(R. 305) 
18. After traffic questions by the public and members of the Planning 
Commission, the City's staff explained: 
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CITY ATTORNEY CARTER: Recentiy the Planning 
Commission received copies of the Master Transportation Plan 
because it was incorporated as an element to the General Plan. 
And it shows the roadway west for 3600 West to accommodate 
future growth in this area. And those estimates for the proper 
roadway width is based upon the notion that this will be built 
out in the future and operating at capacity. And the way in 
which they figured out how many people will be on there will 
be based upon density calculations following the General Plan 
guidelines. 
And so based upon that, the conclusion is that the 3600 West 
width calculation that's recommended in the Master 
Transportation Plan is at a certain width. And I think this is an 
arterial street as you mentioned. 
And I also understand, although I could be corrected on this, 
but the net effect is that the developer would be required to 
dedicate along 3600 West to accommodate the roadway width 
in that area because it will need to be widened insofar as that 
stretch is concerned. 
That's basically how that's handled. 
(R. 308) 
19. The Planning Commission recommended denial of the rezone application. 
The one and only stated reason was the mistaken conclusion that to grant the application 
would constitute spot zoning: 
COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Mr. Chairman, I'm ready to 
make a motion. 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Thank you. 
COMMISSIONER HANSEN: I make a motion that we deny 
PL 07-4009 to rezone the third-acre lots. 
My personal opinion is that would be spot zoning. It's in the 
middle of R-22 and R-l. So I don't think it needs to be there. 
COMMISSIONER LLOYD: I second. 
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COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Okay. We have a motion. 
Do I have a second? 
COMMISSIONER LLOYD: Second. 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Mr. Lloyd seconds. 
AD those in favor? 
COMMISSIONER ALLFREY: Aye. 
COMMISSIONER BROWN: Aye. 
COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Aye. 
COMMISSIONER LLOYD: Aye. 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Any opposed? 
COMMISSIONER DENNEY: Aye. 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Okay. Motion carries four-
to-one. 
(R. 310) 
20. The Petersen Family continued to pursue their Application before the City 
Council. (R. 312) A transcript of the City Counsel proceedings is attached as Exhibit D. 
21. On July 10, 2007, the City Council convened and held a public hearing on the 
Application. (R. 4.) However, the City Council was not informed of the basis for the 
Planning Commission's denial recommendation. The City Council's staff also combined the 
Peterson Family's Application in with another application to rezone land across the street. 
MR. LETHBRIDGE: This first item - and let me just point 
out, in case there is any confusion, there are two rezones that 
are being proposed by D.R. Horton. One of the east side of 
3600 West and the other on the west side. 
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Again the Staff improperly injected the issue of the City's 
proposed purchase of portion of the land to be rezoned. There 
is a portion of this property in the northeast corner, and it's the 
larger parcel shown on your drawing there, that the City has 
been pursuing since prior to the rezone request for a regional 
storm drainage facility. And so while it is certainly part of the 
overall picture, we have been pursuing that acquisition since 
prior to this request for a rezone. 
So we are looking at a portion of this property as a regional 
storm drain facility that would include property outside of just 
this area. 
A transcript of the City Council's hearing on the Application is attached as Exhibit D. 
(emphasis added). (R. 313, 366-384) 
22. After a resident expressed the concern that the rezone would cause a 
subdivision to be connected on to Janice Drive, the City Planner explained the road would 
be connected regardless of the rezone: 
MR. LETHBRIDGE: Yeah. Ultimately, regardless of the 
density of the property, there will be a road connection on 
Janice Drive. 
(R. 314) 
23. The Mayor and City Council then improperly placed the Peterson Family's 
application with the application across the street and told the City Council the City was 
looking at about 200 homes: 
THE MAYOR: Okay. It would be less than 200. And worse 
case - and it's on both sides of 36. So 36 would be the major 
street that would be impacted and you'd be right in there. Yeah. 
Id. at 7:19-12. 
(R. 316) 
13 
24. The discussion above demonstrates that City Council misapprehended the 
Petersen Family's Application. The Mayor stated that the Petersen Family's Application 
involved the potential construction of approximately 200 homes. The Application, however, 
involves only 20.84 acres which supports, at most, only 62 residences1, not the 200 
residences that were the subject of a separate D.R. Horton application. (R. 316) 
25. After lumping the two applications together and believing that a rezone would 
result in 200 additional homes, the City Council returned to a discussion of its intent to 
purchase a portion of the Peterson Family's land at issue: 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Show us where the detention basin 
is planned. Right here? 
MR. LETHBRIDGE: This is the area for the proposed 
detention basin. So it would sit up against the canal, again kind 
of in that northeast corner. 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: A regional; isn't it? 
MR. LETHBRIDGE: Yes. So it's not simply to accommodate 
the drainage for this proposed project. It would take in a much 
broader area. 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Has that been donated to the City 
or are we buying it? 
MR. LETHBRIDGE: Right now I believe we're still in 
negotiations to purchase it. But donation of the property was 
an issue raised by the Applicant as part of their proposal. But 
our Engineering Department had been pursuing negotiation for 
purchase. 
THE MAYOR: Yeah. This is - the detention pond appears to 
be needed from engineering, from our Regional Storm Water 
62 is an overstated number. After land is subtracted for roads and sidewalks, it is 
impossible to develop 62 1/3 acre lots on 20.84 acres. 
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Plan. And we should buy that land when we - whatever 
develops in there because we need it to control the water. And 
so either way, but - so the Council is making a decision on the 
zoning issue for what they feel is the best zone to put in. Yeah. 
Okay. 
(R. 318) 
26. The City Council voted unanimously to deny the Petersen Family's 
Application to rezone the Property. The City Council's denial of the Application resulted in 
the reduction in the value of the Petersen Family's property by more than approximately 
50%. It also eliminated all viable economic use of the Property. (R. 4.) Simply stated, 
developers can't make money by developing on lots in Riverton that are one-half acre or 
larger. (R. 4.) 
27. On the very date that the Riverton City Planning Commission recommended a 
denial of the Petersen Family's application to rezone its land from R-22 (one-half acre lots) 
to R-3 (one-third acre lots), the Planning Commission recommended rezoning property 
across the street to R-3. (R. 17-18.) 
28. The same day that the Riverton City Council denied the Petersen Family's 
Application to rezone to one-third acre lots, the Riverton City Council rezoned property 
across the street to allow one-third acre lots. (R. 28-29. 241, 242) 
SUMMARY O F A R G U M E N T S 
The reasonably debatable standard should not apply to decisions regarding an 
application for a zoning change because such decisions are quasi-judicial rather than 
legislative. This conclusion is supported by Section 10-9a-701 of the Utah code which 
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mandates that a municipal body deciding an appeal regarding a land use ordinance "shall act 
in a quasi-judicial manner." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-701(3). 
Moreover, the consideration of a one parcel rezone is more akin to an adjudicative 
rather than a pure legislative determination. 
In addition, for the "reasonably" debatable standard to mean anything at all in the 
context of a one panel rezone determination, the standard must require some record 
evidence to support the decision. Otherwise, when the reasonably debatable standard 
codified in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(b) is applied in conjunction with Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-9a-102, the reasonably debatable standard becomes no standard at all. The 
vagueness in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-102 assures that every municipal rezone decision will 
be upheld. Perhaps, for this reason, no municipal rezone decision has ever been overturned 
by a Utah appellate court. 
Regardless of the standard of review applied, the City Council's decision cannot stand 
because is it not supported by substantial evidence in the record and was arbitrary, capricious 
and illegal as the decision was based on the Planning Commission's Erroneous Legal 
Conclusions and the City's bad faith intend to drive down the value of the Property so the 
City could acquire a portion of it at less than fair market value. 
There is factual evidence that denial of the Application violated the Petersen Family's 
right to Equal Protection because the Petersen Family, as a "class of one," was treated 
differently that other similarly-situated property owners based solely on the City's bad faith 
intent to acquire a portion of the Property at less than fair market value for a public purpose. 
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Finally, there is factual evidence that the denial of the Application violated the 
Petersen Family's substantive and procedural due process rights because the Petersen Family 
had a protectable property interest which was violated by the City's failure to afford the 
Petersen Family a fair and impartial hearing. Consequently, at a bare minimum, the 
summary judgment should be reversed, and discovery allowed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RIVERTON CITY ON APPELLANTS' 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF A LAND USE DECISION 
A. The Reasonably Debatable Standard as Articulated and Applied 
by the Lower Court Should Not Apply to Quasi-Judicial 
Decisions Regarding an Application for a Zoning Change. 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-801(3)(c) provides that "[a] final decision of a land use 
authority or an appeal authority is valid if the decision is supported by substantial evidence in 
the record and is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." Id. Utah courts have held that a 
municipality's zoning decisions will be set aside where their actions are confiscatory, 
discriminatory, illegal, arbitrary or capricious. Dome v. Salt Lake City Corp., 255 P.2d 723 
(Utah 1953); Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 2000 UT App 31, f7, 997 P.2d 321. Although 
all land use decisions will be upheld unless they are arbitrary, capricious or otherwise illegal, 
the determination of whether a particular land use decision is 
arbitrary and capricious has traditionally depended on whether 
the decision involves the exercise of legislative, administrative, 
or quasi-judicial powers. When a municipality makes a land use 
decision as a function of its legislative powers, [it will be upheld 
as] not arbitrary and capricious so long as the grounds for the 
decision are 'reasonably debatable.' . . . . When a land use 
decision is made as an exercise of quasi-judicial powers [such as 
the decision of a board of adjustment], however, . . . such 
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decisions are not arbitrary and capricious if they are supported 
by 'substantial evidence/ 
Bradley v. Pajson City Corp., 2003 UT 16 ^10, 70 P.3d 47 (quotations and citations omitted). 
In distinguishing between legislative and administrative or quasi-judicial decisions, 
Utah courts have held that large-scale, generally applicable decisions such as master plans are 
legislative in nature and will be upheld if it is reasonably debatable that the decision is in 
furtherance of the general welfare, whereas special or individualized decisions are considered 
quasi-judicial and are held to a higher standard of review in that the decision will be upheld 
only if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record. See e.g., First Nat11 Bank of Boston 
v. County Bd. of Equalisation, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990) (review of administrative 
evaluation of property for tax purposes); See Xanthos v. Bd. of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1035 
(Utah 1984) (review of a board of adjustment's denial of a zoning variance); Wells v. Bd. of 
Adjustment of Salt "Lake City Corp., 936 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (same); Brown v. 
Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207, 210 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (review of a city's 
administrative interpretation of its zoning ordinance) Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 
893 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (approval of a special exception to a zoning 
ordinance); Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (city council's 
denial of conditional use permit). 
Despite the fact that Utah courts have recognized the legislative versus quasi-judicial 
distinction, they have not applied the distinction in the context of zoning decisions. Bradlej 
v. Payson City Corp., 2003 U T 16 1J10, 70 P.3d 47. Rather than delineating between the 
legislative nature of adopting a general zoning plan versus the administrative/quasi-judicial 
nature of an individual request for a zoning change, Utah courts have simply assumed that all 
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zoning decisions are legislative in nature and will be upheld if it is reasonably debatable that 
the zoning decision promotes the general welfare. Id.2 
The landmark decision of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 255 (1980), 
established the "reasonably debatable" standard. In Euclid, the Court stated: 
It must be said before the ordinance can be declared 
unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and 
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, 
safety morals, or general welfare. 
Id. at 365. 
If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning 
purposed be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be 
allowed to control. 
Id. at 388. 
Through the years, the reasonably debatable standard as established in Euclid has 
been watered down to the point where courts and scholars have lamented that it amounts to 
no standard at all: 
Some have construed the fairly debatable standard to mean that 
all a local government need do is hold a hearing where there is a 
debate to sustain the substantive validity of an action. Others 
claim that the fairly debatable rule is an irrebuttable 
presumption of validity, requiring that all a local government 
need do is mouth words of rationality to sustain even the most 
extreme regulatory actions. In either case, judicial review under 
the so-called fairly debatable rule is neither 'swift nor just' and 
too often is little more than a test of whether the local 
government staff is smart enough to invoke the correct mantra 
of rationality. The "anything goes" character of the fairly 
The approach followed by Utah in characterizing all zoning decisions as legislative in 
nature is an approach in which courts tend to focus on the type of body making the 
zoning decision (legislative) in characterizing those decisions as legislative, rather than 
focusing on the type of decision begin made (general rather than applied to specific 
individuals). 
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debatable rule has undermined the integrity of planning and 
zoning and has promoted increasing polarization and division 
between the public and private sectors, ultimately contributing 
to the erosion of planning and zoning powers in the guise of 
property rights legislation. Worse still, the "anything goes" 
mentality has created a lack of judicial 'incentive' to do a 'good' 
job of planning and regulating, which has deprived public 
planning of the funding and political support needed to ensure 
that growth and development is well-planned. 
Charles L. Siemon and Julie P. Kendig, judicial Review of Local Government Decisions: 'Midnight in 
the Garden of Good and Evil," 20 Nova L. Rev. 707 (1996); see also Carol M. Rose, Planning and 
Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 837, 841-42 
(1983) (noting many scholars' concern over whether "the traditional legislative 
reasonableness standard is inadequate to assure fairness and due consideration" in small 
zoning changes); Todd W. Prall, Comment: Dy functional Distinctions in Land Use: The Failure of 
Legislative/Adjudicative Distinctions in Utah and the Case for a Uniform Standard of Review, 2004 
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1049 passim (noting the shortcomings of assuming that even individual zoning 
change requests are legislative in nature and suggesting a substantial evidence standard). 
The commentator's concerns have been validated by Utah Jurisprudence. N o Utah 
Appellate Court has ever overturned a municipal rezone decision. In reality there is no 
judicial review, only a judicial rubber stamp of approval. 
Many courts have rejected and criticized the approach in which all zoning decisions 
are considered legislative and therefore subject to the highly deferential reasonably debatable 
standard. For example, courts have expressed concerns that legislative bodies deciding 
whether to grant or deny a zoning change are actually acting in a judicial capacity by 
"applying general rulefs] or policies] to specific individuals, interests, or situations." Fasana 
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v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26-27 (Ore. 1972). The distinction between legislative 
and administrative or quasi-judicial decisions has its roots in the separation of powers 
doctrine which requires that legislative power be treated differently from judicial power. 
Fasano v. Bd. ofCnty. Cornm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (Ore. 1973), overruled on other grounds by Neuberger 
v. Portland, 607 P.2d 722 (Ore. 1980). As explained by the Fasano court: 
[W]e feel it would be ignoring reality to rigidly view all zoning 
decisions by local governing bodies as legislative acts to be 
accorded a full presumption of validity and shielded from less 
than constitutional scrutiny by the theory of separation of 
powers. Local and small decision groups are simply not the 
equivalent in all respects of state and national legislatures. 
There is a growing judicial recognition of this fact of life: It is 
not a part of the legislative function to grant permits, make 
special exceptions, or decide particular cases. Such activities are 
not legislative but administrative, quasi-judicial, or judicial in 
character. To place them in the hands of legislative bodies, 
whose acts as such are not judicially reviewable, is to open the 
door completely to arbitrary government. 
Id.; see also Colclasure v. Washington County Sch. Dist. No. 48-], 857 P.2d 126, 131 (Ore. 1993). 
In Chrobuck v. Snohomish Cnty., 480 P.2d 489, 495-98 (Wash. 1971), the Supreme Court 
of Washington acknowledged the quasi-judicial nature of zoning decisions: 
Whatever descriptive characterization may be otherwise 
attached to the role or function of the planning commission in 
zoning procedures, e.g. advisory, recommendatory, investigatory, 
administrative or legislative, it is manifest . . . that it is a public 
agency . . . a principle [sic] and statutory duty of which is to 
conduct public hearings in specified planning and zoning 
matters, enter findings of fact - often on the basis of disputed 
facts - and make recommendations with reasons assigned 
thereto. Certainly, in its role as a hearing and fact-finding 
tribunal, the planning commission's function more nearly than 
not partakes of the nature of an administrative, quasi-judicial 
proceeding. 
Id. 
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The distinction between legislative and administrative or quasi-judicial decisions has 
been explained as follows: 
Generally when a municipal legislative body enacts a 
comprehensive plan and zoning code it acts in a policy making 
capacity. But in amending a zoning code, . . . the same body, in 
effect, makes an adjudication between the rights sought by the 
proponents and those claimed by the opponents of the zoning 
change. The parties whose interests are affected are readily 
identifiable. Although important questions of public policy may 
permeate a zoning amendment, the decision has a far greater 
impact on one group of citizens than on the public generally. 
Fleming v. City ofTacoma, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (Wash. 1972) (emphasis added), overruled on other 
grounds by Paynes v. Levenworth, 821 P.2d 1204 (Wash 1992). The Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
"[W]e are persuaded the cases which characterize as quasi-judicial the action of a zoning 
body in applying general rules of policies to specific individuals, interests, or situations 
represent the better rule." Cooper v. Bd of County Comm'rs, 614 P.2d 947, 950 (Idaho 1980); see 
also Margaolis v. Dist. Ct, 638 P.2d 297, 302-04 (Colo. 1981) (zoning amendments decisions 
are not legislative); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 621 So.2d 469, 475 (Fla. 1993) (recognizing 
need to review zoning amendments more like adjudicative proceedings). 
Utah courts have likewise expressly recognized the need for distinguishing between 
large-scale, generally applicable decisions that are clearly legislative in nature and those 
special or individualized decisions that are considered quasi-judicial. Even in the zoning 
context, the Utah Supreme Court has correctly noted on a number of occasions that "the 
passage of general zoning ordinances and the determination of zoning policy [are] properly 
vested in the legislative branch." Sandy City v. Salt "Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 221 (Utah 
1992); Scherbelv. Salt Lake City Corp., 758 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1988). These are precisely the 
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type of large-scale, generally applicable decisions that are legislative in nature and should be 
reviewed under a reasonably debatable standard. In contrast, as expressly noted by other 
courts and commentators, the individual, small-scale requests for a zoning change on a 
particular piece of property, such as is at issue in this case, require a quasi-judicial 
determination and should be viewed under the substantial evidence standard. This result is 
consistent with Utah case law. 
However, in Bradley v. Payson City Corp.^ the Court, expressly citing to Sandy City and 
Scherbel^ over-simplistically stated that "the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances 
is fundamentally a legislative act," without attempting to distinguish between generally 
applicable versus small, individual zoning decisions for purposes of determining what is 
legislative and what is not. 2003 UT 16 ^[11. Yet Sandy City and Scherbel simply do not 
support this overarching statement. Nor is it sustainable in light of the substantial Utah case 
law expressly distinguishing between general, large-scale ordinances and policies and the 
small, individualized municipal decisions. Utah courts have routinely considered these small-
scale, individual decisions to be quasi-judicial in other contexts and there is no basis for 
ignoring that distinction in the zoning context. To the contrary, these are precisely the types 
of decisions for which judicial oversight is strongly needed. 
B. That the Hypothetical Reasonably Debatable Standard Should 
N o t Be Used in One Parcel Rezone Proceeding is Supported by 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-701. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-701 provides that: 
(1) Each municipality adopting a land use ordinance shall, by ordinance, establish 
one or more appeal authorities to hear and decide 
(a) Requests for variances from the terms of the land use ordinances; and 
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(b) Appeals from decisions applying the land use ordinances. 
Id. Section 10-9a-701(3) states that an appeal authority "shall act in a quasi-judicial 
manner" (emphasis added). Thus, section 10-9a-701(3) recognizes and codifies the notion 
that a body, such as the City Council in this case, acting as the City's appeal authority, is 
acting in a quasi-judicial capacity and therefore should be subject to the higher, substantial 
evidence standard. 
The function of the City Council in a one parcel rezone proceeding is substantively 
that of an appeal authority. Under LUDMA, and Riverton's Zoning Ordinance, a rezone 
application is first submitted to the Planning Commission. But the Planning Commission 
only makes a recommendation. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-503(2). But regardless of the 
Planning Commission's recommendation, the City Council makes the final decision. Id. 
And in doing so, the City Council is supposed to apply the criteria found in section 12-200-
010 of its land use ordinance. In short, the City Council makes a final decision in the 
application of its land use ordinance to a one parcel rezone application. Accordingly, Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-9a-701 suggests the City Council must act in a quasi-judicial manner. 
C. The City's Denial of the Petersen Family's Rezoning Application 
Was Not Based On Substantial Evidence in the Record. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(c) provides that a "final decision of a land use 
authority or an appeal authority is valid if the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the 
record. Id. (emphasis added). The City's decision to deny the Petersen Family's Application 
was not based on substantial evidence in the record. The decision was not supported in any 
way by the evidence before the Planning Commission or in the record before the Riverton 
City Council. The transcript of the hearing before the Planning Commission demonstrates 
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that the Commission made its decision to deny the Application in spite of the following: (1) 
Riverton City ordinances providing for buffering measures between differently zoned areas 
(Planning Comm. Tr. at 4:20-21); (2) the rezone Application's compliance with the City's 
General Plan (id. at 5:4-9); (3) a recommendation by Riverton City's Planning Commission 
staff to approve the Application (id. at 5:24-6:3); (4) the City's conclusion that the 
Application would not disturb or alter residents' animal rights (id. at 8:8-9:25); (5) no need 
for a traffic study to determine what impact, if any, the rezoning would have on nearby 
traffic (15:17-18); (6) R-3 zoned property bordering the Petersen Family's Property (id. at 
4:10-11); (7) the fact that residents' irrigation rights would be unaffected by the zoning 
change (id. at 11:17-12:11); and (8) the fact that the Property had sufficient access to support 
the zoning change (id. at 5:19-23). 
In addition, the only evidence in the record that the City Council could have relied 
upon in denying the application was erroneous. First, the City Council considered erroneous 
information in its hearing by confusing D.R. Horton's application regarding a 200 residential 
development with the Application for the rezone of the Property. In reality, the Petersen 
Family's Application only would have resulted in an increase of, at most, 62 residences. 
Second, although there were a handful of public comments made at the hearings regarding 
concerns about existing animal rights and irrigation issues, those concerns were rebutted by 
the members of the Planning Commission and City Council themselves. They could not 
have been the basis for the City Council's decision. Third, although there was also some 
concern about traffic increasing as a result of the additional home sites, the City Council 
noted that traffic concerns are addressed in the subdivision application process. 
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Furthermore, if a mere increase in traffic from development were a sufficient basis for 
sustaining a zoning decision on appeal, then there would effectively be no more judicial 
review of zoning decisions at all. All development, no matter how small, will invariably 
increase traffic. 
Finally, the Planning Commission's denial of the Application on the grounds that it 
would constitute "spot zoning" was also legally erroneous. "Under Utah's jurisprudence, 
spot zoning occurs when a municipality either grants a special privilege or imposes a 
restriction on a particular small property that is not otherwise granted or imposed on 
surroundings properties in the larger area." Tolman v. Logan City, 2007 UT App 260, ^|15, 167 
P.3d 489. "Spot zoning has not occurred where there are a number of properties in the 
larger surrounding area holding the same privileges or restrictions as the property subject to 
a municipality's land use decision." Id. ^|16. 
The Planning Commission based its denial of the Petersen Family's Application on 
the grounds that rezoning the Property from RR-22 to R-3 would constitute "spot zoning" 
as follows: 
COMMISSIONER HANSEN: I make a motion that we deny 
PL 07-4009 to rezone the third-acre lots. My personal opinion 
is that would be spot zoning. It's in the middle of R-22 and R-l. 
So I don't think it needs to be there. 
COMMISSIONER LLOYD: I second. 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Okay. We have a motion. 
Do I have a second? 
COMMISSIONER LLOYD: Second. 
Planning Commission Transcript at 23:19-24. 
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It is undisputed that the parcel adjoining the Property on the West is zoned R-3 
Residential. In addition, Riverton City's zoning map establishes that R-3 zoned areas are 
common place within Planning Subarea 2, in which the Property is located. 
As previously set forth, "[s]pot zoning cannot occur where there are a number of 
properties in the larger surrounding area holding the same privileges or restrictions as the 
property subject to a municipality's land use decision." Tolman^ 2007 U T App 260 at ^]16. 
Granting the Application to rezone the Property at issue to R-3, therefore, would not have 
been spot zoning because the Property shared a common border with another area zoned R-
3 and a number of other properties are zoned R-3 within the same Planning Subarea as the 
Property. 
In short, the City Council did not make its decision to deny the Petersen Family's 
Application based on "substantial evidence in the record." Id. §10-9a-801(3)(c). The record 
before the City Council, as set forth above, contained no substantial evidence on which the 
City could deny the Petersen Family's Application. Rather, the substantial evidence 
supported granting the Petersen Family's Application. 
D . The City Council's Decis ion T o Deny The Application Was 
Arbitrary and Capricious Because it Was Based On The Planning 
Commiss ions' Erroneous Legal Conclusions and the City's Bad-
Faith Intent. 
Even under the "reasonably debatable" standard, the City's denial of the Petersen 
Family's Application is not supportable. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(c) provides that a 
final decision of land use authority or appeal authority is invalid if it is "arbitrary, capricious 
or illegal." Id. The City Council's decision to deny the Application was illegal, arbitrary, and 
capricious because it was motivated by the City's improper intent to drive down the value of 
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the Petersen Family's Property in order to acquire a portion of it for a retention pond and it 
was based on an erroneous legal conclusion. 
A decision is arbitrary or capricious if it falls outside of "limits of reasonableness or 
rationality." Hilte v. Industrial Comm'n, 766 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Utah App. 1988). A decision 
"without foundation in fact" is similarly considered to be arbitrary and capricious." Stegen v. 
Dept. of Employment Sec, 751 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Utah App. 1988). 
The City's decision was illegal, arbitrary, and capricious because it was based on the 
City's desire to drive down the value of the Petersen Family's Property in order to acquire 
the Property for a needed detention basin at a greatly reduced price. The record supports 
this contention. On the very date that the Planning Commission recommended a denial of 
the Petersen Family's application to rezone its land to R-3, the Planning Commission 
recommended rezoning of another property across the street to R-3. On the very date that 
the Riverton City Council denied the Petersen Family's land use application to rezone to R-
3, the Riverton City Council rezoned property across the street for R-3 lots. Similarly 
situated property owners were, therefore, not treated similarly. Other property owners, 
whose property was not needed by the City for a water retention basin, were granted more 
favorable treatment! than the Petersen Family. The only discernible reason for the disparate 
treatment is that the City wanted to acquire the Petersen Family's Property. Indeed, that fact 
figured prominentiy into the City's discussions leading to the denial of the Petersen Family's 
application. 
It is arbitrary and capricious for the City to reject an application for a zoning change 
which meets the requirements of its ordinances and General Plan for the sole purpose of 
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acquiring that property for itself at a greatly reduced price or based on erroneous legal 
conclusions about spot zoning. Consequendy, even if the "reasonably debatable" standard 
were to apply to the City's denial of the Petersen Family's Application, which it should not 
and does not, the City's decision does not meet that standard. 
Furthermore, to the extent that the City's decision was based on erroneous 
conclusions by the Planning Commission about spot zoning or public concerns about animal 
rights or irrigation, it was also illegal, arbitrary, and capricious because those conclusions and 
concerns were without basis in law or fact. As set forth in detail above, granting the 
Petersen Family's Application would not have resulted in spot zoning and would not have 
affected animal rights or irrigation rights. It also would not have resulted in 200 more 
residential units, as contended in the City Council hearings. Viewing the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the Petersen Family, the City's denial of the Petersen Family's Application 
was beyond the "limits of reasonableness or rationality" and "without foundation in fact," 
and was therefore illegal, arbitrary, and capricious. The district court therefore improperly 
granted summary judgment to the City on the Petersen Family's petition for review. 
II. T H E DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RIVERTON CITY ON THE 
PETERSEN FAMILY'S EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS 
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the Petersen Family, the district court 
also erred in granting summary judgment to the City on the Petersen Family's equal 
protection claims. In denying the Petersen Family's Application, the City treated the 
Petersen Family differently in comparison to other similarly situated applicants for the bad 
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faith purpose of devaluing the Property so that the City could purchase it at a lower price for 
use as a diversion pond. The evidence in the record supports these allegations. 
"
c[T]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to 
secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary 
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper 
execution through duty constituted agents." Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 
(2000). A claim based on equal protection can be maintained where a "class of one" alleges 
disparate treatment based on "totally illegitimate animus toward the plaintiff by the 
defendant." Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7 ^|33 (quoting Olech v. Vill of 
Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, the United States Supreme Court considered a case in 
which a couple asked a nearby village to connect their property to the municipal water 
supply. The village required only a 15-foot easement from the other property owners who 
sought to connect to the water supply but required a 33-foot easement from the couple, who 
had previously sued the village. In a per curiam opinion, the Court stated that "[o]ur cases 
have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a cclass of one / where the 
plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly 
situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment." Id. at 563. 
Utah courts have likewise held that, in the zoning context, ££[e]qual protection of the 
law requires that similarly situated persons be treated alike." Gardner v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 
2008 UT 61|38,178 P.3d 893. 
A person claiming that her equal protection rights have been 
violated must demonstrate that she was treated (differently than 
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another person similarly situated and that the unequal treatment 
was based upon an impermissible consideration, such as race, or 
that the selective treatment resulted from a malicious or bad 
faith intent/ ' 
Id. (emphasis added). At issue in Gardner, as in this case, was whether the district court 
properly granted summary judgment dismissing a landowner's equal protection claim arising 
out of a zoning decision. Noting that "there was evidence of dissimilar treatment and an 
allegation, with some evidentiary support, of malicious or bad faith intent on the part of 
county officials," the Utah Supreme Court held that,cc[w]hen the evidence is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the Landowners, summary judgment was not appropriate for this 
claim." Id. j^ 39 (emphasis added). 
In this case, there is evidence of dissimilar treatment by the City and an allegation, 
with some evidentiary support, of malicious or bad faith intent on the part of the City. The 
Petersen Family was intentionally treated differently than other similarly situated individuals 
applying for a zoning change because of the City's bad faith intent to lower the value of the 
Petersen Family's Property in an effort to obtain the Property at less than market value for 
use as a detention pond. It is undisputed that the Planning Commission was aware of the 
City's intention and discussed the issue at its hearing on the Petersen Family's Application: 
U N I D E N T I F I E D MALE: So Andy, in this case, is the " C " the 
storm water management facility that's being bought or — 
P L A N N E R AAGARD: Yeah. That's an area that is being 
negotiated for that purpose." 
Planning Commission Hearing Tr. at 6:22 - 7:1. More importantly, the deliberations of the 
City Council at the public hearing centered almost entirely on the City's need to acquire the 
Property for a detention pond. 
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U N I D E N T I F I E D MALE: Show us where the detention basin 
is planned. Right here? 
MR. LETHBRIDGE: This is the area for the proposed 
detention basin. So it would sit up against the canal, again kind 
of in that northeast corner. 
U N I D E N T I F I E D MALE: A regional; isn't it? 
MR. LETHBRIDGE: Yes. So it's not simply to accommodate 
the drainage for this proposed project. It would take in a much 
broader area. 
U N I D E N T I F I E D MALE: Has that been donated to the City 
or are we buying it? 
MR. LETHBRIDGE: Right now I believe we're still in 
negotiations to purchase it. But donation of the property was 
an issue raised by the Applicant as part of their proposal* But 
our Engineering Department had been pursuing negotiation for 
purchase. 
T H E MAYOR: Yeah. This is - the detention pond appears to 
be needed from engineering, from our Regional Storm Water 
Plan. And we should buy that land when we — whatever 
develops in there because we need it to control the water. And 
so either way, but — so the Council is making a decision on the 
2oning issue for what they feel is the best zone to put in. Yeah. 
Okay. 
Transcript of City Council Meeting at 15:20-17:5. 
Riverton City's refusal to rezone the property pursuant to the Petersen Family's 
Application—after it had given verbal approval of the Application, after the Planning 
Commission staff had recommended approval, in light of the evidence supporting the 
Application, and in the absence of evidence supporting denial of the Application—shows 
that the City was motivated by its bad faith desire to force the value of the Property down so 
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that the City could purchase the Property at a lower price for the construction of the 
detention pond. This is an illegal basis for denying the Petersen Family's Application. 
Furthermore, the General Plan establishes that 1/3 acre lots as permitted in R-3 
zoning are commonplace throughout nearby property and, indeed, throughout the entire 
City of Riverton. The record also shows that on the very date that the Planning Commission 
recommended a denial of the Petersen Family's Application to rezone its land from R-22 to 
R-3, the Planning Commission recommended rezoning a property across the street to R-3. 
The same day that the Riverton City Council denied the Petersen Family's Application to 
rezone to R-3 lots, the Riverton City Council rezoned a different property across the street 
for R-3 lots. Id. Accordingly, the record shows that similarly situated property owners were 
not treated similarly and that other property owners were granted more favorable treatment 
than the Petersen Family. 
The Petersen Family has provided evidence that it was treated different than other 
similarly situated property owners and that the unequal treatment was due to the City's 
malicious and bad faith intent to drive down the value of the Petersen Family's Property in 
order to acquire it for its own purposes. According to the Utah Supreme Court in Gardner, 
all that was required by the Petersen Family in response to the City's motion for summary 
judgment was "evidence of dissimilar treatment and an allegation, with some evidentiary 
support, of malicious or bad faith intent on the part of county officials." Gardner, 2008 U T 6 
TJ39. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Petersen Family, as required, this 
standard was clearly met. The district court therefore erred in granting summary judgment 
to the City on the Petersen Family's equal protection claim. 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE CITY ON THE PETERSEN 
FAMILY'S DUE PROCESS CLAIMS 
The City's decision is illegal and invalid because it violated the Petersen Family's due 
process rights as secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution 
and Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. "Due process is not a rigid concept. 
'Instead, due process is flexible and, being based on the concept of fairness, should afford 
the 'procedural protections that the given situation demands."' Low v. City ofMonticello, 2004 
UT 90 ^15, 103 P.3d 130 (internal citations omitted). Due process requires that a party "be 
given a meaningful opportunity to be heard." State ex rel. W.S.y 939 P.2d 196, 202 (Utah 
App. 1997). 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has delineated the constitutional mandates of 
both procedural and substantive due process rights: "Procedural due process ensures the 
state will not deprive a party of property without engaging fair procedures to reach a 
decision, while substantive due process ensures the state will not deprive a party of property 
for an arbitrary reason regardless of the procedures used to reach that decision." Hyde Park 
Co. v. Santa Fe City Council, 226 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000). The City deprived the 
Petersen Family of both its procedural and substantive due process rights. 
In order "to prevail on either a procedural or substantive due process claim, a 
plaintiff must first establish that a defendant's actions deprived plaintiff of a protectable 
property interest." Id. In Nasierowski Bros. Investment Co. v. City of Sterling Heights, 949 F.2d 
890 (6th Cir. 1991), the court held that a landowner's permitted zoning use became securely 
vested "when he expressly conditioned the purchase of the property on his obtaining a 
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favorable zoning opinion from the City and . . . expended considerable money and effort . . 
. petitioning the City for a variance from the specific site plan requirements." Id. at 897 
(emphasis added). 
Property interests "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules and 
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or 
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those 
benefits." Id. at 1210 (emphasis added). Therefore, in determining whether one has a 
protectable properly interest, the court must look to "existing rules or understandings that 
stem from an independent source such as state law to define the dimensions of protected 
property interests." Ripley v. Wyo. Med Or., Inc., 559 F.3d 1119, 1121 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(emphasis added). "[Constitutionally protected property interests are created and defined by 
statute, ordinance, contract, implied contract and rules and understandings developed by 
state officials." Nichols v. Bd of County Comm'rs, 506 F.3d 962, 970 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis 
added). 
A protectable properly interest therefore arises "by the landowner's substantial 
actions taken in reliance, to his or her detriment, on representations and affirmative actions 
by government" regarding the proposed future use of land. Moreland Properties, LJLC v. 
Thornton, 559 F. Supp.2d 1133, 1145 (D. Colo. 2008). Expending time, money and effort to 
negotiate a purchase agreement for land constitutes substantial action for purposes of the 
protectable property interest analysis. See id. at 1149. 
Here, as in Nasieromki, a protectable property interest arose in favor of the Petersen 
Family when the purchase of the Petersen Family's Property was expressly conditioned on 
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the City's representations to D.R. Horton that the Petersen Family would obtain a favorable 
zoning decision from the City and in the time and effort expended in seeking the rezoning of 
the property. The "understandings" between the parties regarding the rezoning of the 
property created constitutionally protected property interests in approval of the zoning 
application. 
Furthermore, the Petersen Family had a legitimate property interest in, and 
entitlement to, a fair, impartial consideration of its application under law by a governmental 
body that did not have in inherent, irreparable conflict of interest. State law expressly 
requires that municipal land use authority be exercised so as to "provide fundamental 
fairness in land use regulation, and to protect property values." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-102 
(emphasis added). Zoning laws must be strictly construed in favor of the property owner 
because zoning ordinances are limitations on property rights and "are in derogation of 
property owner's common-law right to unrestricted use of property." Brown v. Sandy City Bd. 
of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Instead of a fair and impartial hearing as required by law, the Petersen Family had its 
Application reviewed by a governmental body that was motivated by a bad faith intent to 
drive down the value of the Property that was the subject of the Application. This inherent 
conflict of interest impacted, and deprived the Petersen Family of, a legitimate protectable 
property interest in a fair hearing. By rejecting the Petersen Family's application—which 
complied with the City's own General Plan and ordinances as found by the Planning 
Commission staff—for the purpose of acquiring the Petersen Family's property for itself, 
the City violated state law and the Petersen Family's due process rights. The City simply 
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does not have discretion to reject applications which otherwise meet the requirements of its 
ordinances and General Plan based on its need or desire to obtain the applicant's property. 
Finally, quite simply, the Petersen Family has a protectable property interest in its 
property. As a property owner, the Petersen Family is entitled to a fair and reasonable 
adjudication of a land use Application that dramatically affects the value of its property. By 
unfairly and unreasonably rejecting that Application, due to its ulterior motives, the City has 
eliminated virtually all viable economic use of the Petersen Family's Property—in violation 
of state and local law and in denial of due process. 
The final factor in a procedural due process claim is whether "the individual [was] 
afforded an appropriate level of process." Hennigh v. City of Shawnee, 155 F.3d 1249, 1253 
(10th Cir. 1998). As set forth in detail above, the City deprived the Petersen Family's of due 
process by failing to provide the Petersen Family with an impartial adjudication of its 
Application by decision-makers free of inherent and irremediable conflicts of interest. 
Although the record is replete with discussions between the City's representatives of the 
City's need for the Property and its desire to purchase the Property, the record does not 
contain so much as a single statement by the City justifying its denial of the Petersen 
Family's Application to change the zoning for the Property. In light of this facial, inherent 
conflict of interest, such actions simply cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. The 
Petersen Family has alleged, with supporting evidence, that the City had a conflict of interest 
in reviewing the Application and denied the Petersen Family's Application in order to obtain 
the Property for itself. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Petersen 
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Family, summary judgment on the Petersen Family's procedural due process claim was 
clearly inappropriate. 
The City actions also deprived the Petersen Family of its substantive due process 
rights. "When a fundamental right is not at issue, a statute will not violate substantive due 
process if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Gardner v. Bd. of County 
Comm'rs, 2008 U T 6 ^33. In this case, the City intentionally denied the re2oning application 
to injure the Petersen Family for the City's own benefit in acquiring a portion of the 
Property. This is simply not a legitimate state interest. 
The City denied the Petersen Family's Application so that it could acquire the 
Property for use as a diversion pond. Thus, the Petersen Family was never given a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard, in violation of its procedural and substantive due 
process rights. This is clear from the overwhelming evidence before the Planning 
Commission and in the record before the Riverton City Council supporting the Application. 
The evidence in support of granting of the Application, the summary denial of the 
Application without any basis in fact or in the record, and Riverton City's undisputed intent 
to acquire a portion of the Property demonstrate the denial of the Petersen Family's due 
process rights. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Petersen Family, the 
district court wrongly granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the Petersen 
Family's due process claims. 
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IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PETERSEN 
FAMILY'S REQUEST FOR A CONTINUANCE UNDER UTAH 
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56(f) 
The district court erroneously denied the Petersen Family's Rule 56(f) motion based 
on its incorrect conclusion that Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(8) limited review to the record. 
This section simply does not apply to federal constitutional claims. It is well established that 
state "statutes [cannot] abrogate constitutional rights." See Greenivay Dev. Co. v. Borough of 
Paramus, 750 A.2d 764, 770 (N.J. 2000). For this reason, the Utah Court of Appeals, citing 
to Greenway, concluded that statutory notice-of-claim provisions did not apply to 
constitutional takings claims. Heughs Ljznd, L.L.C v. Holladay City, 2005 UT App 202 ]^11 
n.l (noting that courts have determined that state notice-of-claim laws are "inapplicable in 
actions alleging violations of federal as well as state constitutional rights"). Likewise, 
applying § 10-9a-801(8) to claims of federal constitutional violations would effectively 
abrogate those rights by restricting one's ability to establish such violations. This section is 
therefore wholly inapplicable to the constitutional equal protection and due process rights at 
issue in this case. 
Faced with facially sufficient allegations that the City violated the Petersen Family's 
constitutional rights, the court must consider matters outside of the record, and discovery 
outside of the record is therefore appropriate and necessary. See Springville Citizens for a Better 
Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, ^13, 979 P.2d 332 (allowing discovery in a land 
use case involving alleged violations of the state and federal constitutions). The district court 
therefore erred in denying the Petersen Family's Rule 56(f) motion and permitting additional 
discovery. 
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The Petersen Family must be allowed to conduct written discovery and depose 
Riverton's Mayor, members of the Riverton Planning Commission, and members of the 
Riverton City Council regarding their organized and concerted efforts to devalue the 
Petersen Family's Property by denying the Application after expressly stating that the 
Application would be approved. In addition, the Petersen Family must also be permitted to 
depose representatives of D.R. Horton who were present at a meeting in which the City's 
representatives stated that they would approve the Petersen Family's Application as well as 
similarly situated persons who submitted applications for rezoning to Riverton City. Upon 
information and belief, by denying the Petersen Family's Application, Riverton City intended 
to devalue the Petersen Family's Property so that the City could purchase the property at a 
reduced price for the construction of a diversion pond. The Petersen Family is entitled to 
conduct discovery to prove that this action was arbitrary, capricious, confiscatory, 
discriminatory, and illegal, in violation of the Petersen Family's constitutional rights to equal 
protection and due process. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The lower court's summary judgment is founded upon an incorrect judicial standard 
of review or the misapplication of the Judicial Standard of Review. The reasonably 
debatable standard as described and applied by the lower court is no standard of review at 
all. Instead it is a guarantee of affirmation for every municipal rezone decision. 
Moreover, there are genuine issues of whether the City's denial of the application to 
further its personal economic interest was illegal, denied equal protection or violated due 
process. 
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For these plain compelling reasons, the summary judgment should be reversed, and 
the City Municipal Land Use decision likewise be overturned, or at the very least the case 
remanded for trial. 
DATED thi day of July, 2009. 
VAN COTT B AGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
By: 
Dale F. Gardiner 
Scott M. Lilja 
Cassie J. Medura 
Nicole M. Deforge 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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Chapter 9a Municipal Land Use, Development, and Management 
Section 102 Purposes — General land use authority. 
10-9a-102. Purposes — General land use authority. 
(1) The purposes of this chapter are to provide for the health, safety, and welfare, and promote the 
prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort, convenience, and aesthetics of each 
municipality and its present and future inhabitants and businesses, to protect the tax base, to secure 
economy in governmental expenditures, to foster the state's agricultural and other industries, to protect 
both urban and nonurban development, to protect and ensure access to sunlight for solar energy devices, 
to provide fundamental fairness in land use regulation, and to protect property values. 
(2) To accomplish the purposes of this chapter, municipalities may enact all ordinances, resolutions, 
and rules and may enter into other forms of land use controls and development agreements that they 
consider necessary or appropriate for the use and development of land within the municipality, including 
ordinances, resolutions, rules, restrictive covenants, easements, and development agreements governing 
uses, density, open spaces, structures, buildings, energy efficiency, light and air, air quality, 
transportation and public or alternative transportation, infrastructure, street and building orientation and 
width requirements, public facilities, fundamental fairness in land use regulation, considerations of 
surrounding land uses and the balance of the foregoing purposes with a landowner's private property 
interests, height and location of vegetation, trees, and landscaping, unless expressly prohibited by law. 
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Title 10 Utah Municipal Code 
Chapter 9a Municipal Land Use, Development, and Management 
Section 701 Appeal authority required - Condition precedent to judicial review -- Appeal authority duties. 
10-9a-701. Appeal authority required — Condition precedent to judicial review — Appeal authority 
duties. 
(1) Each municipality adopting a land use ordinance shall, by ordinance, establish one or more appeal 
authorities to hear and decide: 
(a) requests for variances from the terms of the land use ordinances; and 
(b) appeals from decisions applying the land use ordinances. 
(2) As a condition precedent to judicial review, each adversely affected person shall timely and 
specifically challenge a land use authority's decision, in accordance with local ordinance. 
(3) An appeal authority: 
(a) shall: 
(i) act in a quasi-judicial manner; and 
(ii) serve as the final arbiter of issues involving the interpretation or application of land use ordinances; 
and 
(b) may not entertain an appeal of a matter in which the appeal authority, or any participating member, 
had first acted as the land use authority. 
(4) By ordinance, a municipality may: 
(a) designate a separate appeal authority to hear requests for variances than the appeal authority it 
designates to hear appeals; 
(b) designate one or more separate appeal authorities to hear distinct types of appeals of land use 
authority decisions; 
(c) require an adversely affected party to present to an appeal authority every theory of relief that it can 
raise in district court; 
(d) not require an adversely affected party to pursue duplicate or successive appeals before the same or 
separate appeal authorities as a condition of the adversely affected party's duty to exhaust administrative 
remedies; and 
(e) provide that specified types of land use decisions may be appealed directly to the district court. 
(5) If the municipality establishes or, prior to the effective date of this chapter, has established a 
multiperson board, body, or panel to act as an appeal authority, at a minimum the board, body, or panel shall: 
(a) notify each of its members of any meeting or hearing of the board, body, or panel; 
(b) provide each of its members with the same information and access to municipal resources as any other 
member; 
(c) convene only if a quorum of its members is present; and 
(d) act only upon the vote of a majority of its convened members. 
Enacted by Chapter 254, 2005 General Session 
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10-9a-801. No district court review until administrative remedies exhausted — Time for filing -
- Tolling of time — Standards governing court review — Record on review - Staying of decision. 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use decision made under this 
chapter, or under a regulation made under authority of this chapter, until that person has exhausted the 
person's administrative remedies as provided in Part 7, Appeal Authority and Variances, if applicable. 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of or in violation of the 
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the district court within 30 
days after the local land use decision is final. 
(b) (i) The time under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition is tolled from the date a property owner files 
a request for arbitration of a constitutional taking issue with the property rights ombudsman under 
Section 13-43-204 until 30 days after: 
(A) the arbitrator issues a final award; or 
(B) the property rights ombudsman issues a written statement under Subsection 13-43-204(3)0)) 
declining to arbitrate or to appoint an arbitrator. 
(ii) A tolling under Subsection (2)(b)(i) operates only as to the specific constitutional taking issue that 
is the subject of the request for arbitration filed with the property rights ombudsman by a property 
owner. 
(iii) A request for arbitration filed with the property rights ombudsman after the time under 
Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition has expired does not affect the time to file a petition. 
(3) (a) The courts shall: 
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority of this chapter is valid; 
and 
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal. 
(b) A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of legislative discretion is valid if it is 
reasonably debatable that the decision, ordinance, or regulation promotes the purposes of this chapter 
and is not otherwise illegal. 
(c) A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the decision is supported 
by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision, ordinance, or regulation 
violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time the decision was made or the ordinance or 
regulation adopted. 
(4) The provisions of Subsection (2)(a) apply from the date on which the municipality takes final 
action on a land use application for any adversely affected third party, if the municipality conformed 
with the notice provisions of Part 2, Notice, or for any person who had actual notice of the pending 
decision. 
(5) If the municipality has complied with Section 10-9a-205, a challenge to the enactment of a land 
use ordinance or general plan may not be filed with the district court more than 30 days after the 
enactment. 
(6) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the appeal authority's decision is final. 
(7) (a) The land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, shall transmit to the reviewing 
court the record of its proceedings, including its minutes, findings, orders, and, if 
available, a true and correct transcript of its proceedings. 
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of that tape recording is a true and correct 
transcript for purposes of this Subsection (7). 
(8) (a) (i) If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the record provided by the land 
use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be. 
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the record of the land use authority or 
appeal authority, as the case may be, unless that evidence was offered to the land use authority or appeal 
authority, respectively, and the court determines that it was improperly excluded. 
(b) If there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take evidence. 
(9) (a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of the land use authority or authority appeal 
authority, as the case may be. 
(b) (i) Before filing a petition under this section or a request for mediation or arbitration of a 
constitutional taking issue under Section 13-43-204, the aggrieved party may petition the appeal 
authority to stay its decision. 
(ii) Upon receipt of a petition to stay, the appeal authority may order its decision stayed pending 
district court review if the appeal authority finds it to be in the best interest of the municipality. 
(iii) After a petition is filed under this section or a request for mediation or arbitration of a 
constitutional taking issue is filed under Section 13-43-204, the petitioner may seek an injunction 
staying the appeal authority's decision. 
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JUDGES: DURHAM, Chief Justice. Associate Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Russon, Justice Wilkins, and Judge Baldwin 
concur in Chief Justice Durham's opinion. [ * * 5 8 ] Having recused himself, Justice Howe does not participate herein; 
Second District Judge Parley R. Baldwin sat. 
OPINION BY: DURHAM 
OPINION 
[ * * 4 9 ] DURHAM, Chief Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
[ *P1] This case arises from the decision of the Payson City Council (Payson City or City Council) to deny Plaintiffs' two 
applications to rezone property within Payson City (the property) from R-l-A low density residential/agricultural use to R-
2-75 high density residential use. The trial court determined that Payson City's decision was arbitrary and capricious 
because it was not supported by "substantial evidence." The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, 
holding that application of the "substantial evidence" standard was erroneous [ * * * 2 ] because Payson City's zoning 
decision was a legislative decision. Bradley v. Pavson City. 2001 UT App 9, P28, 17 P.3d 1160. Under the court of 
appeals' view of the arbitrary and capricious standard, only quasi-judicial or administrative decisions are subject to the 
"substantial evidence" standard while legislative decisions are subject to the more deferential "reasonably debatable" 
standard. 
BACKGROUND 
[ *P2] The Plaintiffs below are owners of property in Payson City zoned as R-l-A, which is a low-density residential 
zone. The property is located west of Interstate 15 (1-15) and is surrounded by property that is also zoned R-l-A. Some 
two and one-half blocks east of the property is a large area of land that is zoned R-2-75, which is the same zoning 
designation the Plaintiffs seek. The 1995 Payson City General Plan (General Plan), which was in effect at the time the 
Plaintiffs sought rezoning, forecasts primarily residential land use east of 1-15 and industrial and agricultural uses for 
property west of 1-15. While the intent of the General Plan seems to be to utilize 1-15 as a natural buffer between 
residential and industrial uses, the Payson Planning [ * * * 3 ] Zone Map (Payson Zone Map), also adopted in 1995, does 
provide for some areas of residential use west of 1-15. 
[ *P3] In January 1996, the Plaintiffs applied to rezone their property from R-l-A to R-2-75, which is a residential 
zoning designation that permits multiple family dwellings. During a meeting before the Payson City Planning Commission 
(Planning Commission) on the issue of the rezone application, the Chairperson acknowledged that because "there are 
already other residential developments in the surrounding area where this rezone would take place, there may not be a 
problem in rezoning this to R-2-75." After considering the Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone application, the Planning Commission 
Staff Report recommended that the Planning Commission recommend approval of the rezone to the Payson City Council. 
[ *P4] At the public hearing before the Planning Commission on Plaintiffs' rezone application, a petition signed by thirty-
eight people was submitted by a neighborhood group that opposed the zoning change. In addition, thirteen individuals at 
the hearing expressed their opposition to the R-2-75 rezone. The public opposition voiced concerns over the adequacy of 
the area's [ * * * 4 ] infrastructure as well as concerns about maintaining the agricultural nature of the area, which 
includes using the land for raising horses. Several public comments also supported the rezone. After public comment, the 
Planning Commission recommended that the Payson City Council deny the R-2-75 rezone. 
[ *P5] The City Council then held a public hearing on the R-2-75 rezone application. The same thirty-eight signature 
petition was submitted to the City Council, and, subject to one or two exceptions, the same individuals appeared before 
the City Council as before the Planning Commission. In addition to voicing concerns about raising animals and preserving 
the nature of the neighborhood, other comments raised concerns about traffic levels in the area. Advocates of the 
application, including planning expert Jim Wilbert, expressed the area's need for low income housing. Ultimately, the City 
Council voted to deny the rezoning based upon the General Plan, traffic concerns, and the Planning Commission's 
recommendation. 
[ *P6] [ * * 5 0 ] The Plaintiffs later submitted a second Zoning Change Application, requesting that their property be 
rezoned from R-l-A to R-l-9. An R-l-9 zoning is a medium-density [ * * * 5 ] residential zoning. Both the Planning 
Commission staff and the Planning Commission recommended approval of the R-l-9 rezone. The R-l-9 rezoning came 
before the City Council for public hearing on May 22, 1996. Public input included comments by representatives of 
businesses in the abutting industrial area. Associated Foods raised concerns that truck noise would cause residents to 
seek action against it. Representatives of a fruit-processing plant questioned whether residents would tolerate the noise 
and smell of its packing facilities. After the hearing was closed, the City Council voted to deny the R-l-9 rezoning 
request. 
[ *P7] The Plaintiffs commenced this action by verified complaint on April 1, 1997. They alleged that the Payson City 
Council's denials of their rezone requests were arbitrary and capricious and that the denials constituted a taking without 
just compensation. Payson City filed a motion for summary judgment, requesting that the district court dismiss the 
complaint because the Payson City Council had acted within its legislative prerogative. The Plaintiffs responded by filing a 
cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court entered a Memorandum Decision on January 22, 1999, 
reversing [ * * * 6 ] the City Council's denial of the Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone application, finding that the denial had no 
evidentiary support and was therefore arbitrary and capricious. Consequently, the district court did not address the denial 
of Plaintiffs' second rezone application. 
[ *P8] Payson City appealed the trial court's decision directly to this court, after which this court transferred the appeal 
to the court of appeals pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 44. On January 11, 2001, the court of appeals 
issued an opinion reversing the district court's decision, concluding that the trial court had applied the incorrect standard 
of review to Payson City's legislative land use decisions and that under the "reasonably debatable" standard, Payson 
City's denial of the rezoning requests was not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Bradley. 2001 UT App 9 at P28. The 
Plaintiffs then filed a petition for writ of certiorari to review the substance of the court of appeals' decision. Payson City 
filed a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the court of appeals' conclusion that it had original appellate 
jurisdiction to decide the appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[ * * * 7 j [ *P9] w / v i ¥when reviewing a city council's decision not to change the zoning classification of property, we 
presume that the decision is valid and "determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) (1999). The principal issue in this case is the meaning of "arbitrary and capricious" in the 
context of Payson City's decision not to change the zoning classification of the Plaintiffs' property. This is a legal issue 
which we review for correctness. SprinQville Citizens for a Better Cmtv. v. City of SprinQville. 1999 UT 25, P22, 979 P.2d 
332. 
ANALYSIS 
I. APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW GOVERNING APPEALS OF 
MUNICIPAL LAND USE DECISIONS 
A. Distinction Between Legislative and Administrative Actions 
[ *P10] This court has long recognized that " ' ^ m u n i c i p a l land use decisions should be upheld unless those decisions 
are arbitrary and capricious or otherwise illegal. Gavland v. Salt Lake County. 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633, 636 (Utah 
1961); Marshall v. Salt Lake City. 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704. 709 (Utah 19431. Indeed, municipal [ * * * 8 ] land use 
decisions as a whole are generally entitled to a "great deal of deference." SprinQville Citizens for a Better Cmtv. v. City of 
SprinQville. 1999 UT 25, P23, 979 P.2d 332. However, in specific cases the determination of whether a particular land use 
decision is arbitrary and capricious has traditionally depended on whether the decision involves the exercise of legislative, 
administrative, or quasi-judicial powers. When a municipality makes a land use decision as a function of its legislative 
powers, we [ * * 5 1 ] have held that such a decision is not arbitrary and capricious so long as the grounds for the 
decision are "reasonably debatable." Marshall. 141 P.2d at 709 (reviewing municipal zoning decision as legislative 
function and employing reasonably debatable standard); Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City. 958 P.2d 245, 252 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) (same). When a land use decision is made as an exercise of administrative or quasi-judicial powers, however, we 
have held that such decisions are not arbitrary and capricious if they are supported by "substantial evidence." Xanthos v. 
Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake City. 685 P.2d 1032, 1034-35 (Utah 1984) [ * * * 9 ] (reviewing board of adjustment 
decision as an administrative act and employing substantial evidence standard). 
[ *P11] There is no dispute in this case that W/V3¥the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances is fundamentally 
a legislative act. Sandy City v. Salt Lake County. 827 P.2d 212, 221 (Utah 1992) ("the passage of general zoning 
ordinances and the determination of zoning policy [are] properly vested in the legislative branch) (quoting Scherbel v. 
Salt Lake City Corp.. 758 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1988)). The political nature of the decision making process underlying 
municipal zoning demands that the power to make such decisions be vested in persons who are publicly accountable for 
their choices. See Marshall. 141 P.2d at 709 (noting that accountability for balancing competing interests in zoning 
decisions properly resides in the "governing body of the city"). 
[ *P12] We have long recognized that Hyv4¥zoning decisions that are made as an exercise of legislative powers are 
entitled to particular deference. In Crestview-Holladav Homeowners Ass'n. Inc. v. Enoh Floral Co.. we noted that the prior 
decisions of this court without [ * * * 1 0 ] exception have laid down the rule that the exercise of zoning power is a 
legislative function to be exercised by the legislative bodies of the municipalities. The wisdom of the zoning plan, its 
necessity, the nature and boundaries of the district to be zoned are matters which lie solely within that discretion. It is 
the policy of this court as enunciated in its prior decisions that it will avoid substituting its judgment for that of the 
legislative body of the municipality. 
545 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah 1976) (citing Marshall. 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704: Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake 
Citv. 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d 177 (Utah 1949); Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 123 Utah 107, 255 P.2d 723 (Utah 1953): 
Navlor v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 17 Utah 2d 300, 410 P.2d 764 (Utah 1966)). Given this deferential disposition, we have 
held that it is "the court's duty to resolve all doubts in favor" of the municipality, and the burden is on the plaintiff 
challenging a municipal land use decision to show that the municipal action was clearly beyond the city's power. Ga viand. 
358 P.2d at 636. 
[ *P13] [ * * * 1 1 ] In light of the particular deference we accord legislative zoning decisions, we have regularly 
distinguished zoning decisions that are made as a function of legislative power from decisions that are made as an 
exercise of either administrative or quasi-judicial power. " '^•Legis lat ive zoning decisions involve the determination and 
enactment of zoning policies and cannot be delegated to other governmental bodies. Sandy City. 827 P.2d at 221. Such 
decisions are distinct from administrative or quasi-judicial zoning decisions. For example, in Sandy City, we noted that 
while a municipality has the authority to formulate and implement zoning policies as an exercise of legislative power, a 
municipality cannot thereafter delegate some portion of that authority to a board of adjustment because a board of 
adjustment is a quasi-judicial body designed only to correct specific zoning errors. Id. at 220-21; see also Salt Lake 
County Cottonwood Sanitary Dist v. Sandy City. 879 P.2d 1379, 1383 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing distinction 
between executive and legislative powers with respect to zoning decisions); Xanthos. 685 P.2d at 1034 [ * * * 1 2 ] 
(treating board of adjustment decision as an administrative act). 
B. The "Reasonably Debatable" and 
"Substantial Evidence" Tests 
[ *P14] As mentioned at the outset, our recognition of w / v 6 ^ the distinction between legislative and administrative or 
quasi-judicial municipal powers has consistently determined the proper standard of review applicable to [ * * 5 2 ] 
municipal land use disputes. For legislative decisions, we have applied a highly deferential variation of the arbitrary and 
capricious standard and limited our review to the strict question of whether the zoning ordinance '"could promote the 
general welfare; or even if it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest of the general welfare."' Smith Inv. Co.. 958 
P.2d at 252 (quoting Marshall. 141 P.2d at 709): Walker v. Briaham City. 856 P.2d 347, 349 (Utah 1993) (holding that 
the municipality's legislative decision would be upheld unless "wholly discordant to reason and justice"); Dowse. 255 P.2d 
at 724 (holding that zoning could be attacked only if there was "no reasonable basis therefor"). "The selection of one 
method of solving the problem in preference [ * * * 1 3 ] to another is entirely within the discretion of the [c i ty] ; and does 
not, in and of itself, evidence an abuse of discretion." Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity. 2 1 2 P . 2 d a t l 8 1 . 
[ *P15] HN7*?For administrative or quasi-judicial land use decisions, however, the substantial evidence test has 
traditionally applied. We have defined substantial evidence as "that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is 
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. County Bd. of 
Equalization. 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990) (reviewing administrative evaluation of property for tax purposes). This 
standard has been applied to an array of administrative and quasi-judicial land use decisions. See e.g., Xanthos. 685 
P.2d at 1035 (reviewing board of adjustment's denial of a zoning variance); Brown v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment. 957 
P.2d 207, 210 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (reviewing city's administrative interpretation of its zoning ordinance); Wells v. 
Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake City Corp.. 936 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Utah Ct. APP. 1997) (reviewing board of adjustment 
decision [ * * * 1 4 ] denying variance); Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment. 893 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct. APP. 
1995) (reviewing trial court's finding of an arbitrary and capricious action by county in approving special exception to 
zoning ordinance). Thus, while municipal land use decisions in Utah are valid unless arbitrary and capricious, the specific 
meaning of that standard is dependent upon the nature of the land use decision at issue. 
I I . MEANING AND EFFECT OF UTAH CODE SECTION 10-9-1001(3)AND THE SPRINGVILLE CITIZENS CASE 
[ *P16] The Plaintiffs do not dispute the existence of the traditional distinction between the standard of review 
applicable to legislative as opposed to administrative and quasi-judicial land use decisions. Rather, they claim that since 
the Utah Legislature's adoption of Utah Code section 10-9-1001 and this court's decision in Sprinoville Citizens for a 
Better Community v. City of SprinQville. 1999 UT 25. 979 P.2d 332, the substantial evidence test is now applicable to all 
municipal land use decisions, whether legislative, administrative, or quasi-judicial. 
[ *P17] [ * * * 1 5 ] The starting point for the Plaintiffs' "one-size-fits-all" approach to the standard of review for 
municipal land use decisions is the Utah Legislature's 1991 enactment of Utah Code section 10-9-1001. That provision 
codified the procedures for appealing municipal land use decisions. Section 10-9-1001(3) addresses the judicial standard 
of review for such decisions, stating: 
HN8
*{3) The courts shall: 
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary and capricious, or illegal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) (1999). The Plaintiffs argue that section 10-9-1001(3) was intended to create a single 
standard of review for all municipal land use decisions and that it impliedly overrules this court's earlier decisions 
applying different interpretations of the arbitrary and capricious standard to different exercises of municipal power. 
[ *P18 ] ^ ^ " W h e n construing statutory language which is plain and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the same to 
divine legislative intent." Cole v. Jordan Sch. Dist. 899 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 1995). H / V J 0¥The plain [ * * * 1 6 ] language 
of section 10-9-1001(3) clearly states that the arbitrary and capricious standard is applicable to all municipal land use 
decisions. However, the statute does not address the [ * * 5 3 ] distinct applications of the arbitrary and capricious 
standard to legislative, administrative, and quasi-judicial decisions that we have recognized for more than half a century. 
In the absence of express statutory language to the contrary, we do not presume that the legislature, in enacting section 
10-9-1001(3), intended to overrule the prior decisions of this court and impose a uniform interpretation of the arbitrary 
and capricious standard for all municipal land use decisions, regardless of whether those decisions are legislative, 
administrative, or quasi-judicial. See jcL (noting that in the absence of express statutory language the court will not 
assume the legislature intended to overrule an earlier decision of this court when it enacted a statutory amendment). x 
FOOTNOTES 
1 The court of appeals agreed with this interpretation of section 10-9-1001(3) in Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City. 
2000 UT App 31 . 997 P.2d 321. In upholding a city council's refusal to rezone property for a shopping center on the 
grounds that the city's decision was reasonably debatable, the court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs argument that 
section 10-9-1001(3) required the uniform application of the substantial evidence test under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard. After reviewing the earlier case law we have discussed in this opinion, the court concluded that 
the 1991 enactment of section 10-9-1001(3), which largely codifies [municipal land use case law], did not alter the 
deferential review of a municipality's legislative zoning classification decisions under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard. 
Id.. 2000 UT 31 P14. 
[ * * * 1 7 ] [ *P19] To support their claim that section 10-9-1001(3) does indeed apply to all three kinds of municipal 
land use decisions, the Plaintiffs rely on our opinion in Sprlngvllle Citizens. In that case we stated, HN11lt"[a] 
municipality's land use decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is not supported by substantial evidence." SprinQville 
Citizens. 1999 UT 25 at P24. The Plaintiffs interpret this language as a "sweeping statement" that the court had, "without 
reservation, unanimously accepted the legislature's plain language" in section 10-9-1001(3). We disagree. 
[ *P20 ] The dispute in Springville Citizens arose out of Springville City's approval of a planned unit development (PUD) 
pursuant to city ordinances. SprinQville Citizens. 1999 UT 25 at PP 1. 2. A developer sought approval of a PUD pursuant 
to those ordinances and the procedures contained therein. Id. 1999 UT 25 at P2. The plaintiffs action alleged that 
Springville City's approval of the PUD was arbitrary, capricious, and illegal because Springville City had failed to follow its 
own mandatory ordinances in approving the PUD. Id. 1999 UT 25 at P12. 
[ *P21 ] In holding that Springville [ * * * 1 8 ] City's decision was not arbitrary and capricious, we did not discuss 
whether the decision was legislative, administrative, or quasi-judicial: we stated simply that "[a] municipality's land use 
decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is not supported by substantial evidence." Id. 1999 UT 25,at P24. The Plaintiffs 
read this language as announcing a uniform standard of review for all municipal land use decisions. Nothing in Springville 
Citizens, however, evidences this court's intent to abandon the traditional distinction between the standard of review for 
legislative, administrative or quasi-judicial decisions. Furthermore, nothing in Springville Citizens suggests, as the 
Plaintiffs argue, that the legislature's 1991 enactment of section 10-9-1001(3) affected our application of the arbitrary 
and capricious standard to different exercises of municipal power. The essence of the Plaintiffs' argument is that 
Springville Citizens overruled the cases recognizing the legislative/administrative distinction by implication. 
[ *P22] For its part, Payson City has tried to reconcile Springville Citizens with this court's prior municipal land use 
cases by explaining that the [ * * * 1 9 ] decision in that case was an administrative one that required application of the 
substantial evidence test. Payson City argues that all of the issues we addressed in Springville Citizens arose from the 
administrative processing of the PUD application pursuant to the standards set forth in city ordinances. Specifically, they 
note that the court focused on the certification of drawings by an irrigation company, SprinQville Citizens. 1999 UT 25, 
P15, 979 P.2d 332, whether the planning commission had reviewed the final plat, engineering drawings and documents 
as required by city ordinance, id. at P16. whether modification [ * * 5 4 ] required by the city council to the final 
subdivision plat had been referred to the planning commission as required by city ordinance, id. 1999 UT 25 at P17, and 
others examples. Each of these examples prove, Payson City argues, that the focus was on compliance with procedural 
requirements, not with "any basic policy decisions involving the exercise of legislative discretion." A more direct 
explanation for our statement of the standard of review in that case, however, is found in Springville City's assertion in 
its brief in that case that the challenged decision was [ * * * 2 0 ] "an administrative one" that was subject to the 
substantial evidence test. Brief for Appellee, at 19, SprinQville Citizens for a Better Cmty. v. Citv of SprinQville. 1999 UT 
25, 979 P.2d 332 (No. 980028). Given that the municipality itself acknowledged both the administrative nature of the 
decision and the applicability of the heightened substantial evidence test, it is not surprising that we stated municipal 
land use decisions were subject to the substantial evidence test; the municipality conceded as much. 
[ *P23 ] Thus, what the Plaintiffs describe as a "sweeping statement" of a new "one-size-fits-all" standard of review in 
Springville Citizens was nothing more than a recognition that both the parties and the court agreed that the challenged 
action was administrative and should be subject to the substantial evidence test. The absence of an acknowledgment of 
the distinction between legislative and administrative decisions in Springville Citizens stemmed solely from the fact that 
the standard of review was not a contested issue in that case. Therefore, we decline the invitation to treat SprinQville 
Citizens as a deviation from our traditional application [ * * * 2 1 ] of the arbitrary and capricious standard to different 
types of municipal land use decisions.2 
FOOTNOTES 
2 Relying on its earlier decision in Harmon City. 2000 UT App 31 , 997 P.2d 321, the court of appeals in its decision 
below also read Sprlngville Citizens as involving an administrative decision that was subject to the substantial 
evidence test. Bradley. 17 P.3d 1160, 2001 UT App 9, P15. The court noted that "Springville Citizens involved judicial 
review of an administrative proceeding governed by city ordinances that expressly limited the city's discretion over 
PUD approvals." Id. Because the decision was administrative, the court of appeals recognized that Springville Citizens 
required application of the substantial evidence test while Payson City's legislative zoning decision must be evaluated 
under the reasonably debatable standard, Id± 
I I I . UNDER THE REASONABLY DEBATABLE STANDARD PAYSON CITY'S DENIAL OF THE PLAINTIFFS' REZONING REQUEST 
WAS 
NOT ARBITRARY AND [ * * * 2 2 ] CAPRICIOUS 
[ *P24] Having concluded that the reasonably debatable standard applies to legislative municipal land use decisions, we 
now proceed to evaluate whether Payson City's denial of the Plaintiffs' rezoning request was arbitrary and capricious 
under that standard. w / V J 2 ¥ ln general, because a "zoning classification reflects a legislative policy decision," we will not 
interfere with that decision "except in the most extreme cases." Harmon City. 2000 UT App 31 at P18, 997 P.2d 321. The 
guiding principle behind our interpretation of legislative zoning decisions is that we will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the municipality. cCrestview-Holladav Homeowners Ass'n.. 545 P.2d at 1152. Though a municipality may have a 
myriad of competing choices before it, "the selection of one method of solving the problem in preference to another is 
entirely within the discretion of the [ci ty] ; and does not, in and of itself evidence an abuse of discretion." Phi Kappa Iota 
Fraternity. 212 P.2d at 179. The propriety of the zoning decision need only be "reasonably debatable." Marshall. 141 P.2d 
at 709. 
[ *P25] The Plaintiffs [ * * * 2 3 ] argue that the court of appeals erred in holding that Payson City's denial of their 
rezoning request was not arbitrary and capricious under the reasonably debatable standard. The Plaintiffs argue that 
there was a general lack of evidence presented to the Payson City Council to support the reasonableness of its denial of 
the rezone application. The Plaintiffs further argue that the basis of Payson City's decision contradicted some record 
evidence supporting the zoning change. We will address each of the Plaintiffs' specific arguments in turn. 
[ *P26] [ * * 5 5 ] First, the Plaintiffs argue that Payson City's zoning decision was unreasonable to the extent it was 
based on the General Plan's recognition of 1-15 as a natural buffer between residential and industrial uses. The Plaintiffs 
argue that Payson City failed to consider that, unlike the General Plan, the Payson Zone Map actually provides for large 
areas of residential use west of 1-15 and that their proposed rezoning would be consistent with the uses of neighboring 
properties in the zone map. This discrepancy between the General Plan and the Payson Zone Map is not conclusive 
evidence that Payson City's decision was arbitrary and capricious. [ * * * 2 4 ] To the contrary, Payson City's reliance on 
the General Plan as a basis for its decision is precisely the kind of legislative decision that should be left to the city council 
and undisturbed by the judiciary. I t is not up to the court to determine whether Payson City made the right decision or 
the best decision in relying on the General Plan rather than the Payson Zone Map. We evaluate only whether it was 
reasonably debatable that the decision reached would promote the general welfare. Payson City's reliance on the long-
term policy preferences embodied in the General Plan satisfies the reasonably debatable standard. 
[ *P27] Additionally, the Plaintiffs assert that Payson City "almost exclusively relied on public comments" made at the 
public hearing before the city council as a basis for the denial of their rezoning proposal and argue that citizen opposition 
alone cannot be the basis for the municipality's action. See Davis County v. Clearfield City. 756 P.2d 704. 712 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) (applying substantial evidence test to denial of conditional use permit and holding that citizen opposition 
alone is an insufficient basis for denial of permit). For example, the [ * * * 2 5 ] Plaintiffs argue that Payson City relied on 
citizens' concerns about increased traffic as a basis for the denial of the rezone application, even though no actual 
evidence of traffic problems was presented other than those public comments. 
[ *P28] It is beyond question, however, that " ^ ^ p u b l i c hearings and citizen comments are a legitimate source of 
information for city council members to consider in making legislative decisions. See Harmon City. 2000 UT APP 31 at 
P26, 997 P.2d 321 (noting that "a city may rely on the concerns of interested citizens when performing legislative 
functions"). In reviewing the city council's decision, we do not apply trial-like "formal rules of procedure or evidence" to 
evaluate the substance of public comments received by the city council. Gay land. 358 P. 2d at 635. Rather, we presume 
that city council members will measure public comments against their own personal knowledge of the various conditions 
in the city that bear upon zoning decisions. See id. at 636. A city council's ultimate decision, of course, reflects legislative 
preferences that are entitled to a presumption of validity. Id. 
[ *P29] Like the [ * * * 2 6 ] court of appeals in its decision below, we are satisfied that Payson City's consideration of 
public comments as a justification for its zoning decision reflects a reasonable judgment that properly took into account 
citizens' concerns. 
The court of appeals cited a number of items in the record to support this conclusion: 
Specifically, two businesses in the area expressed concern over the compatibility of higher density residential areas with 
their businesses and the neighboring industrial zones. One of the businesses submitted a letter detailing why it located in 
the area. This business stated it was attracted to the area because the "master plan . . . was far sighted enough to 
separate the industrial area from the residential area by a natural break." The business stated that it operates twenty-
four hours a day with "bright dock lights, and large trucks . . . all of which would be a concern for the future residential 
area that is proposed." Another businessman in the area testified that because his business was contiguous to the 
proposed zone change he felt he would be out of business within a year because neighboring residents would not tolerate 
the noise and smell from his [ * * * 2 7 ] fruit processing plant. 
Bradley. 2001 UT App 9 at P23. Additionally, the court of appeals noted that many residents opposed the zoning change 
because they wanted to maintain the area for agricultural uses such as keeping [ * * 5 6 ] and raising horses, which might 
be incompatible with high-density residential development. Id. 2001 UT App 9 at P26. Each of these concerns is a 
legitimate ground for denying the Plaintiffs' proposed zoning change. Payson City has the right to deny a zoning change 
request if it "has a reasonable basis to believe that it will conserve the values of other properties and encourage the most 
appropriate use thereof." Smith Inv. Co.. 958 P.2d at 255. 
[ *P30] Furthermore, with respect to the Plaintiffs' argument that there was no evidentiary support behind public 
comments about increased traffic, we simply note that HN14^3 city council is not required to receive advice from experts 
before making a legislative zoning decision. Moreover, we are not persuaded that the comments of the Plaintiffs' planning 
expert, Jim Wilbert, cast doubt on the reasonability of Payson City's decision. Mr. Wilbert spoke at the public hearing in 
favor of [ * * * 2 8 ] the zone change because it would bring affordable housing to the nearby industrial center. However, 
even assuming that affordable housing is an important addition to the city plan, Mr. Wilbert's comments do not directly 
refute the concerns raised by local business owners and other residents about the compatibility of high-density residential 
housing in the industrial and agricultural zones. See Bradley. 17 P.3d 1160. 2001 UT App 9, P27. The City Council's 
decision to give greater weight to Mr. Wilbert's opponents and deny the rezoning simply reflects the exercise of legislative 
policy preferences that are entirely within its discretion. 
[ *P31] Finally, the Plaintiffs challenge Payson City's reliance on the Planning Commission's negative recommendation 
as a basis for the rezone denial. The Plaintiffs contend that the Planning Commission's decision was predicated entirely on 
neighboring citizens' opposition to the proposed rezone and that reliance on such views was an unreasonable basis for 
the zoning decision. In light of our holding that it was reasonable for the City Council to rely on public comments in 
making its decision, we need not also address the reasonability of the [ * * * 2 9 ] Planning Commission's similar reliance. 
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT HAVE ORIGINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER CASES ARISING FROM LAND 
USE 
DECISIONS BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 
[ *P32] Payson City originally appealed the trial court's reversal of the City Council's decision to deny the Plaintiffs' 
rezone application directly to this court. Bradley. 2001 UT App 9 at P8. Pursuant to Rule 44 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, this court then transferred the appeal to the court of appeals, stating that the appeal was not within our 
original appellate jurisdiction. Id. 
[ *P33] w y v i 5¥Under Utah Code section 78-2a-3, the court of appeals has original jurisdiction to hear appeals from trial 
court review of "adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i) (2002) (emphasis added). This provision is designed to establish a body of expertise in the 
court of appeals for review of such "adjudicative proceedings" under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 63-46b-0.5 [ * * * 3 0 ] to -22 (1997 & Supp. 2001). The Utah Administrative Procedures Act governs "all state 
agency actions." Id. § 63-46b- l ( l ) (a ) . An "adjudicative proceeding" is specifically defined as an action by a state agency 
under the Administrative Procedures Act. Id. § 63-46b-2( l ) (a). The Act specifically excludes from the definition of 
"agency" "any political subdivision of the state, or any administrative unit of a political subdivision of the state." Id. § 63-
46b-2( l ) (b ) ; Daws County. 756 P.2d at 706-07. Critically, the appeal in this case arises not from an "adjudicative 
proceeding," but rather from a limited judicial review of a local legislative land use decision under Utah Code section 10-
9-1001. Thus, it is apparent that w y v j 6 ¥utah Code section 78-2a-3 does not give the court of appeals original jurisdiction 
over appeals from district court review of land use decisions by the governing body of a municipality. The governing body 
of a municipality cannot be an "agency of [a] political subdivision[] of the state" under that section. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i). 
[ * * * 3 1 ] [ *P34] [ * * 5 7 ] In an attempt to resolve the confusion created by the jurisdictional statutes and our 
transfer of this appeal, the court of appeals nevertheless determined that "it must have jurisdiction" and stretched the 
meaning of section 78-2a-3 to accommodate this view. 3 Bradley. 2001 UT App 9 at P9. The court noted: 
The supreme court, however, seems to have consistently determined that it does not have original appellate jurisdiction 
over zoning cases under the catch-all provision found in section 78-2-2(3)(j). Accordingly, this court must have 
jurisdiction. Examining section 78-2a-3, the only provision that could apply is subsection 2(b)(i) which gives this court 
jurisdiction over "appeals from the district court review of adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i) (1996). As Payson City's counsel noted, 
however, this case does not arise from an "adjudicative" proceeding, but rather a legislative proceeding. Nevertheless, in 
order to effectuate the supreme court's order transferring these appeals to this court, "adjudicative" must [ * * * 3 2 ] be 
read broadly to include both administrative and legislative proceedings of state political subdivisions and local 
governments. Thus, read in conjunction with section 78-2-2, governing the supreme court's jurisdiction, section 78-2a-3 
(2)(b)(i) confers original appellate jurisdiction to this court over this matter. 
Id. 
FOOTNOTES 
3 While we appreciate the court of appeals' valiant attempt to account for our transfer of this case to that court, we 
must observe that it overlooked another possible explanation: we incorrectly transferred it to them in the first place. 
[ *P35] We agree with Payson City that the court of appeals' conclusion on this point is not consistent with a close 
reading of the statutory language. The jurisdiction of the court of appeals is defined by section 78-2a-3(2). HN17?\Nhen 
interpreting statutes, we look primarily to the statute's plain language. Hercules Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 877 P.2d 
133, 136 (Utah 19941. Furthermore, we will not infer substantive provisions into [ * * * 3 3 ] a statute that are not 
expressly contained therein. Cole v. Jordan Sch. Dist.. 899 P.2d 776. 778. HN18?lt is clear that there is no provision 
within section 78-2a-3(2) that expressly grants the court of appeals original jurisdiction over district court review of land 
use decisions by local governmental entities. We therefore conclude that this court has original appellate jurisdiction over 
such cases under Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(j), which provides that this court has jurisdiction over "orders, judgments, 
and decrees of any court of record over which the court of appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0). 4 
FOOTNOTES 
4 The legislature might consider amending section 78-2a-3(2) to give the court of appeals original jurisdiction over 
municipal zoning decisions. This could be accomplished by amending section 78-2a-3(2), which currently gives the 
court of appeals original jurisdiction over "adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or 
other local agencies" to give that court original jurisdiction over "proceedings of political subdivisions of the state or 
their agencies." 
[ * * * 3 4 ] CONCLUSION 
[ *P36] HW19!?Municipal land use decisions are presumed valid unless they are arbitrary and capricious. In this case, we 
reaffirm that whether a particular municipal land use decision is arbitrary and capricious depends upon whether the 
municipality has acted in a legislative, administrative, or quasi-judicial capacity. Legislative land use decisions are valid so 
long as they are reasonably debatable. Administrative and quasi-judicial decisions, however, continue to be subject to the 
substantial evidence test. Under the reasonably debatable standard, Payson City did not act arbitrarily and capriciously 
when it acted in a legislative capacity to deny the Plaintiffs' application to rezone their property. 
[ *P37] Additionally, we hold that the court of appeals does not have original jurisdiction to hear challenges to land use 
decisions by municipal governing bodies, and vacate the decision of the court of appeals. 
T*P38] Associate Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Russon, Justice Wilkins, and Judge Baldwin concur in Chief Justice 
Durham's opinion. 
[ *P39] Having recused himself, Justice Howe does not participate herein; Second District Judge Parley R. [ * * * 3 5 ] 
Baldwin sat. 
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Rule 5 6 . S u m m a r y j u d g m e n t . 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a c la im, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory j u d g m e n t 
may, at any t ime after the expirat ion of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a mot ion for 
summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterc la im, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory j u d g m e n t is 
sought, may, at any t ime , move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The mot ion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The 
judgmen t sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, deposit ions, answers to interrogator ies, and admissions on f i le, together 
wi th the aff idavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is ent i t led to 
a j udgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment , inter locutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of l iabi l i ty 
alone a l though there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on mot ion. I f on mot ion under this rule j udgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for 
all the relief asked and a tr ial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the mot ion, by examining the pleadings and the 
evidence before it and by interrogat ing counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist w i thout substant ia l 
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controver ted. I t shall thereupon make an order specifying 
the facts that appear wi thout substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is 
not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are jus t . Upon the tr ial of the action the facts so 
specified shall be deemed established, and the tr ial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of aff idavits; fur ther tes t imony; defense required. Support ing and opposing aff idavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set for th such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show aff i rmatively that the aff iant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated there in . Sworn or certif ied copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an 
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewi th . The court may permit aff idavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
deposit ions, answers to interrogator ies, or fur ther aff idavits. When a motion for summary j udgmen t is made and suppor ted 
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for t r ia l . Summary j udgmen t , if appropr iate, shall be entered against a party fai l ing to file such a response. 
(f) When aff idavits are unavailable. Should it appear f rom the affidavits of a party opposing the mot ion that the party cannot 
for reasons stated present by aff idavit facts essential to just i fy the party's opposi t ion, the court may refuse the appl icat ion 
for j udgmen t or may order a continuance to permit aff idavits to be obtained or deposit ions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is jus t . 
(g) Affidavits made in bad fa i th. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad fai th or solely 
for the purpose of delay, the court shall for thwi th order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the fi l ing of the aff idavits caused, including reasonable at torney's fees, and any offending 
party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt . 
Section 12-200 Genera) Provision (Zoning) 
adopted 2/27/95 
SECTION 12-200 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
12-200-005 
12-200-010 
12-200-015 
12-200-020 
12-200-025 
12-200-030 
12-200-035 
12-200-040 
12-200-045 
12-200-050 
12-200-055 
12-200-060 
12-200-065 
12-200-005 
Purpose 
Amendments 
Qualifying Regulations 
Sidewalk Impact Fee 
Fire Facilities Impact Fee 
Building 
Streets and Right-of-Ways 
Lot Improvements 
Fences and Visual Obstructions 
Conservation Value 
Home Occupation 
Animals and Fowl 
N on -Conforming Building and 
Uses 
PURPOSE 
The general purpose of the Zoning Ordinance of 
Riverton City is for the promoting of the health, 
safety, morals, convenience, order, prosperity and 
welfare of the present and future inhabitants of the 
City, including but not limited to: minimizing of 
the congestion on the streets and roads, securing 
safety from fire and other dangers, providing 
adequate light and air, classifying land uses to 
distribute development and utilization, protecting 
the local tax base, securing economy in 
governmental expenditures, fostering agriculture 
and other industries and protecting urban and non-
urban development. 
12-200-010 AMENDMENTS 
The zoning map and use restrictions may be 
amended by the City Council from time to time, 
but any amendment shall be first submitted to the 
Planning Commission for its review and comment. 
No proposed amendment affecting the number, 
shape boundary or zoning classification of any 
zone shall be adopted unless the proposed zoning 
ordinance amendment complies with the following 
criteria: 
1. The proposed amendment will place all 
property similarly situated into the same 
zoning classification or in complementary 
classification. 
2. That all uses permitted under the proposed 
zoning amendment are in the general 
public interest and not merely in the 
interest of an individual or small group. 
3. AH uses permitted under the proposed 
zoning classifications amendment will 
be appropriate in the area to be included 
in the proposed zoning amendment. 
4. The character of the neighborhood will 
not be adversely affected by any use 
permitted in the proposed zoning 
classifications. 
5. The proposed zoning amendment is 
consistent with the City's Master Plan. 
Before adopting any amendment to the zoning 
Ordinance the City Council shall hold a public 
hearing. Notice of the time and place of the 
hearing shall be given by at least one (1) 
publication in a newspaper of general circulation 
in the City, at least fifteen days before the 
hearing. The cost of publication shall be paid by 
the applicant for the zoning change. 
On any property requested for rezoning, (except 
for rezoning initiated by the City to implement 
general planning objectives) the applicant shall 
be required to post the property in question with 
a Notification of Rezoning which states the zone 
classification being requested and the time and 
place of Public Hearing. The signs shall be 
obtained from the City and be posted at 500-foot 
intervals around the property and on all corners 
at least fifteen (15) days prior to the public 
hearing. All adjacent property owners and all 
owners within one-thousand (1,000) feet shall be 
notified (15) days prior to the date of the hearing. 
Mailed notification shall comply with 
requirements set forth by the City. Cost and 
responsibility of such posting and notification 
shall be borne by the applicant. 
12-200-015 Supplementary and 
Qualifying 
Regulations 
A. Lots in Separate Ownership - Reduced 
Yards. The requirements of this Chapter as 
to minimum lot area or lot width shall not 
prevent the use for a single-family dwelling 
on any lot or parcel of land in the event that 
the lot or parcel of land was held in separate 
ownership at the time such parcel become 
non-conforming as to area or width. 
B. Area of Lots Including a Public Right-of-
Way. Lots created prior to the adoption of 
local zoning regulations, having a public 
right-of-way included in the parcel 
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BEFORE THE RIVERTON CITY PLANNING COMMISSION 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
07-4009 D.R. HORTON EAST 
RE ZONE 
Property located at 12175 
South 3600 West from RR-22 
to R-3 
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Location: Riverton City Civic Center 
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A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE C O M M I S S I O N : 
L a r r y Br own -
J ames A 1 1 f r ey 
J ames D e n n e y 
D e n n i s H a n s e n 
L a n g f o r d L l o y d 
C h a i r 
FOR THE APPLICANT: 
Micah Peters, D.R. Horton, Inc 
ALSO PRESENT: 
City Attorney Carter 
City Planner Aargard 
City Planner Prestwich 
City Engineer Miner 
Deputy City Recorder Cutler 
PUBLIC SPEAKERS: 
Rober t Luke 
Jeff Howell 
Kelly L amha r t 
L aur i (1vey) Snyde r 
oOo 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Okay. Let's move 
onto our next item, which is another rezone, 07-4009. 
And Andy - -
PLANNER AAGARD: It might be appropriate 
to give it a few minutes. 
COMMISSION CHA]R BROWN: Okay. Folks, if 
you would take your conversations out in the hall so 
we can continue our meeting. 
Thank you . 
Give us just a minute folks while these 
people get out of the room and we'll get on with our 
business . 
Okay. Let's go ahead and we'll continue 
our meeting. 
Sir, would you please take your seat. 
Okay. Could we please have the staff 
repor t . 
Hey, guys, please, we're trying to conduct 
our meet i ng . 
Thank you . 
PLANNER AAGARD: Okay. T h i s i s an 
a p p l i c a t i o n t o rezone 20 .84 ac res of p r o p e r t y " loca ted 
at 12175 South 3600 West . C u r r e n t l y zoned RR-22 . 
CITICOURT. LLC 
8 0 1 . 5 3 2 . 3 4 4 1 
] 
2 
3 
A 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
?3 
!4 
'5 
The Applicant is requesting to rezone to R-3. 
Again, this application has been initiated 
by D.R. Horton and not by Riverton City. But we are 
facilitating this application for them. 
The subject property is bounded on the 
north by property that is zoned RR-22. with half-acre 
lots . 
The property to the south is zoned R-l. 
The property to the east is zoned RR-22. 
And to the west, the property is zoned R-3 
and R-2 . 
The purpose of both zones are single 
family residential uses. The main difference between 
the two zones are as follows: 
The RR-22 and R-l zone allow large animals 
as a permitted use. The R-3 zone does not. 
The lot sizes of the RR-22 and R-l zones 
are one and one-half acre. And the R-3 zone allows a 
minimum of 14,000 or a third-acre lot. 
Riverton City ordinances do have buffering 
measures where property zoned for animals are 
adjacent to property not zoned for animals. If the 
rezoned R-3 is approved by the Planning Commission 
and the City Council, those measures will be dealt 
with as part of the subdivision approval. 
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This application is to discuss only the 
appropriateness of the property being zoned R-3 
verses RR-22. 
This is an image of the City's General 
Plan. Riverton City -- or the rezone request does 
comply with the City's General Plan. The General 
Plan designation for this property is low density 
residential, which requires a density per lot sizes 
of 14 , 000 square foot lots . 
There is a separate issue regarding the 
eastern end of the subject property. Riverton City 
has been working to acquire property in that location 
for a storm water management facility from the 
property owner, and recently the Applicant. Property 
acquisition and price negotiations are not the 
responsibility of the Planning Commission to consider 
and therefore should not be relevant to this zoning 
request . 
The property does have sufficient access 
to accommodate development under the R-3 zone. There 
is access to Janice Drive on the north and on the 
south of the subject property. As well as access to 
3600 West . 
Because the rezone request of the R-3 zone 
does comply with the City's General Plan and 
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sufficient buffering measures exist under City 
ordinances, the staff is recommending approval of the 
request to rezone to R-3. 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Thank you, Andy. 
Is there any questions from the Commission 
for the staff? 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Andy, do you by any 
chance have a more aerial view of this, a larger 
cross section of this area? 
PLANNER AAGARD: 1 don ' t . 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: All right. Thank you. 
PLANNER AAGARD: There is an image that 
again the Applicant has asked that 1 present to the 
Planning Commission that does show the proposed 
layout of this area if they were to subdivide with 
R-3 . 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: All right. Would 
the Applicant like to come up and propose his rezone? 
MR. PETERS: Not much to say. Pretty 
straight R-3. 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Thank you. 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: So Andy, in this case, 
is "C" the storm water management facility that's 
being bought or --
PLANNER AAGARD: Yeah. That's an area 
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1 I that is being negotiated for that purpose. 
2 j UN]DENT]F]ED MALE: What are "B" and " A" ? 
3 PLANNER AAGARD: 1 believe they'll be part 
4 of it. I'm not sure why they - -
5 UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Part of the storm 
6 water management facility? 
7 PLANNER AARGARD: Correction. They're 
8 lots . 
9 UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Okay. They're just 
10 good lots because they're alphabetical. 
11 COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Okay. Same rules 
12 apply -
13 We'll go ahead and open the public 
14 hearing. 
15 Give us your name as you come up. 
16 Is there anyone who would like to address 
17 this issue? 
18 MR. LUKE: Robert Luke. 3465 Jamison 
19 A v e n u e . 
20 I'm going to plead a little ignorance 
21 here. 
?2 The difference between R-22 and R-3 is 
13 purely animals? Or what's the difference? 
!4 I COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Animals and lot 
5 I size. 
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MR. LUKE: Animals and lot size. 
If R-3, which is no animals, goes in and 
people start complaining about people to the north or 
south having animals, will that ever effect our 
animal rights? 
You know, for like people moving next to a 
gun range or something, you have to shut down the gun 
range. 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Not unless it's 
r ezoned . 
PLANNER AAGARD: And 1 would even add to 
that . 
That even if it is rezoned and people have 
been using their -- exercising their animal rights on 
their property, they would have what's called a legal 
non-conforming use right to the property. That means 
if you change the zoning, but you've been keeping 
horses on your land that entire time, you can go 
right on keeping those horses on your land, 
regardless of how the rezone occurs. The more common 
term for that is you're "grandfathered" in. And you 
would continue to be able to have that right to keep 
animals on that land so long as you continuously do 
so and don't abandon that use for a period of time. 
Usually it's a year. 
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COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: What he's talkinj 
about is people who are actually on R-22s, not the 
rezone area. 
PLANNER AAGARD: Right. ] understand 
that . 
So as 1 understand the Applicant's 
question is, would the people who do have animal use 
rights run in danger of losing them pursuant to 
foreseen complaints brought by people who are 
neighbors to there, who don't have animals rights. 
And the shortest reply is only if a re2one occurs. 
And 1 would just add to that that even if 
a rezone occurs that takes away the animal use rights 
on paper, you still have the right to use that land 
as legal non-confor ming use right. If you can 
continually use it that way. 
MR. LUKE: Hypothetically, let's say all 
these homes get built this year, January 1, they 
start complaining, you all take up a rezoning effort 
and you change the zoning, when will we have had to 
have had a horse there? How far back do we have to 
go? F i ve year s ? 
PLANNER AAGARD: Well, no. No. No. As 
long as there is a horse there the day that the 
rezone occurs, then you have a legal right. 
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1 I MR. LUKE: Okay. So go out and get a 
2 [ horse then. 
3 PLANNER AAGARD: And ] would also say -- 1 
4 would also add that it's highly unusual. And in 
5 fact, in ten years of doing this, I've never seen an 
6 instance where a property's animal use rights has 
7 been taken away as a result of complaints levied by 
8 late-coming neighbors. Never seen that happen. 
9 World changes, but never seen that happen. 
10 Anyway. 
11 MR. HOWELL: My name is Jeff Howell. ] 
12 live at 12213 Janice Drive, right next to Lot A, 
13 which is special there. 
14 But 1 heard in your explanation that you 
15 said there would be some kind of buffer between 
16 one-acre lots and the smaller lots. 
17 What do you mean by that? 
18 COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: W e l l , if the R-3 
19 zone is approved, the City does have ordinances that 
>0 would require a certain type of fencing able to 
1 withstand impacts from animals, that it would be 
2 installed as part of the subdivision. So that is one 
3 buffering measure the ordinance does provide for this 
4 situation. 
5 MR. HOWELL: So that's all there is to 
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that buffering, you just have to have a --
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Exactly. 
MR. HOWELL: Like a masonry wall or a 
steel wall? 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: No. It doesn't 
even have to be a masonry wall. 
And would you please address your 
questions to the Council, not to the staff. 
Thank you. 
MR. HOWELL: Thank you. ] was just asking 
him a question. 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Buffering is a 
six-foot fence. And it could be a vinyl fence. It 
does not have to be a masonry fence. 
Just so everybody knows up front. It's 
got to be a solid fence. 
MR. HOWELL: Okay. There is also an 
irrigation ditch right on that line. What would 
happen with that ? 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: What's that? 
MR. HOWELL: An irrigation ditch all the 
way down that line, what would happen about that? 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: It either has to 
be piped or kept in use or moved so you still have 
access, the people who have rights to it, have access 
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t o i t . 
MR. HOWELL: ] don't have access I have 
access to a different ditch, not that particular one. 
But that's, like, right under my fence. 
So are they just going to terminate it 
upstream somewhere and take it somewhere else? 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: They possibly 
could, but it has to be, like 1 say, either piped or 
rerouted so it can still be used. But the people 
still have to have the right to use the irrigation 
out of that ditch. 
MR. HOWELL: 1 have one more question. 
If they develop it as it's shown up there, 
are you going to put any restrictions on where they 
have construction access? Or can you put any 
restrictions on where they have construction access? 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: That would go 
through the Engineering Department of the City. 
MR. HOWELL: They could come in off of 
3600 and not disrupt all the other neighborhoods. It 
would be a great concern for me if they start shoving 
all the construction traffic down Janice Drive, which 
is now a dead end. 
PLANNER AAGARD: Right . 
MR. HOWELL: Bringing all that through 
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there. 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Any more 
quest ions 7 
MR. HOWELL: No. 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Okay. Thank you 
Is there anyone else who would like to 
address this issue? 
MR. LAMHART: 1 live at 12082 South 
Kenmore, which 1 have three-quarters of an acre right 
there - -
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Would you state 
you r name, please. 
MR. LAMHART: My name is Kelly Lamhart. 
And I would like to see them leave it 
zoned what it is only because all they're trying to 
do is get more houses and less property. That isn't 
what we moved out here for. That isn't what the 
people in Riverton want is just to keep condensing, 
keep condensing, so they can make more money on the 
prope r ty . 
We came out here to have horse property. 
I think we need to stay that way. We need to stay 
where we have less people, more land and use it for 
what we moved out here for. 
Thank you . 
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1 I MS. SNYDER: Hi. My name is ]vey Snyder 
2 I J live at 12066 South Kenmore Circle. 
3 My concern here, again, is the traffic. 
4 You've got a number of main accesses onto 3600 W e s t . 
5 And right now it's two-way traffic. Two lane. I'd 
6 like to see a traffic study done before any building 
7 goes on . 
8 Thank you . 
9 COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Thank you. 
10 Anyone else who would like to address this 
11 i ssue ? 
12 (No verbal response.) 
13 COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Okay. If not, 
14 we'll go ahead and close the public hearing and bring 
15 it back to the Commission. 
16 COMMISSIONER tLOYD: Andy, 1 had one 
17 question. 
18 The reason we can recommend or the reason 
19 the staff is recommending that this conforms for 
20 third-acre downzoning, even though it's surrounded 
11 mainly by half-acre zoning and larger, is because it 
> 2 conforms to the General Plan that says medium density 
'3 can be third or half-acre; is that correct? 
4 PLANNER AAGARD: Yes. That's one of the 
5 reasons we -- we're recommending approval. And also 
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because of the fencing requirements that help to 
buffer animal rights properties versus non-animal 
rights properties. 
COMMISSIONER ALLFREY: The question was 
just brought up about a traffic study by the last 
person here. 
Can we get some information on traffic 
studies that have been done in the area? Obviously 
we're dealing with 118th South, 3600 West, 
development on the South Jordan side being very 
heavy, and also proposed subdivisions here. All told 
here, we're probably talking 200 roof tops. 
PLANNER AAGARD: Well, that's one the 
Planning Department would have to defer to the 
Engineering Department on. 
ENGINEER MINER: The request was for 
engineering information. There hasn't been a traffic 
impact study done. So I can't speak to that. 
COMMISSIONER ALLFREY: None in the area 
completely around 36th and 118th? 
ENGINEER MINER: Well, there was a traffic 
impact study done for another item on the agenda 
here, but it didn't address -- it didn't address this 
prope r ty . 
COMMISSIONER ALLFREY: The S t r e e t M a s t e r 
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Plan, which shows 3600 West via an arterial street 
certainly took into account that the rest of the 
properties would be feeding it7 
ENGINEER MINER : Agreed . 
COMMISSIONER ALLFREY: Assuming that those 
took into consideration the arterial road, the one 
that was done on 118th South, the other item on the 
agenda, did that --
ENGINEER MINER: I'm sorry. State that 
again, please. 
COMMISSIONER ALLFREY: Okay. You 
mentioned that you did a traffic study for another 
item on the agenda for 118th and 3600 West? 
ENGINEER MINER: Yes. 
COMMISSIONER ALLFREY: Okay. At the time 
that you did that study, would you have not assumed 
that based on the plan currently under place in the 
General Plan, that those houses would be filled in or 
those areas would be filled in with residential 
areas? Or would you base it on just the current 
popula t i on? 
ENGINEER MINER: No. The study -- the 
purpose of the study was for the particular applicant 
to assess their impacts and their impacts alone. You 
know, the item that we're talking about is Item E, 
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the St. Andrew Private School. And so that traffic 
impact study, their responsibility was to demonstrate 
the impacts from their application. 
COMMISSIONER ALLFREY. Thank you. 
CITY ATTORNEY CARTER: Recently the 
Planning Commission received copies of the Master 
Transportation Plan because it was incorporated as an 
element to the General Plan. And it shows the 
roadway west for 3600 West to accommodate future 
growth in this area. And those estimates for the 
proper roadway width is based upon the notion that 
this will be built out in the future and operating at 
capacity. And the way in which they figured out how 
many people will be on there will be based upon 
density calculations following the General Plan 
guidelines. 
And so based upon that, the conclusion is 
that the 3600 West width calculation that's 
recommended in the Master Transportation Plan is at a 
certain width. And I think this is an arterial 
street as you mentioned. 
And I also understand, although 1 could be 
corrected on this, but the net effect is that the 
developer would be required to dedicate along 3600 
West to accommodate the roadway width in that area 
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1 I because it will need to be widened insofar as that 
2 | stretch is concerned 
3 I That's basically how that's handled. 
4 And I'm not sure exactly how much of 3600 
5 West has been widened through the rest of that area. 
6 But that would probably address the immediate 
7 concerns to accommodate roadway width in that area to 
8 the extent they can, the developer can. 
9 An added traffic study might take a look 
10 at how much increase impact there would be on the 
11 surrounding intersections to see if additional 
12 traffic signals would be warranted as traffic empties 
13 onto 3600 West from the subdivision. Something like 
14 that could still be explored at the time that a 
15 subdivision application were to come forward. 
16 COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Okay. Thank you. 
17 Okay. If there are no more questions, do 
18 I have a mot i on? 
9 COMMISSIONER ALLFREY: 1 have one more 
0 ques t i on actually. 
1 COMMISSIONER LLOYD: 1 have one more 
2 quest ion, too. 
3 COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Go ahead. You 
4 J were up first. 
COMMISSIONER LLOYD: R y a n , I j u s t h e a r d 
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1 I that attorney answer. And my question is this, what 
2 I does the ordinance say when a new 20 acres of 
3 property are developed, what requirement does a 
4 developer have to see what type of a traffic impact 
5 that development will place on the community l e g a l l y 7 
6 MR. RYAN: Well, first of a l l , they're 
7 supposed to develop in a manner that doesn't 
8 interfere with the Master T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Plan. Okay. 
9 So in this case, that would mean just taking a look 
10 at the frontages of the roadway in relation to 3600 
11 West. It would mean that they could not develop in a 
12 manner that interferes with the future roadway width 
13 projections for 3600 West. That's the first rule. 
14 That's the most basic. And in a rezone, that's where 
15 it's mos t relevant. 
16 But most of the applications of how to 
17 incorporate traffic and things like that come into 
18 P^ay at the time of subdivision. And the subdivision 
19 standards are not immediately specific. What they do 
20 require is that you don't -- the s u b d i v i s i o n 
21 standards do not create an unreasonable burden on the 
22 area for traffic. And if there is an u n r e a s o n a b l e 
23 burden on the surrounding area for t r a f f i c , according 
?4 to the City Engineer's Standards and G u i d e l i n e s , then 
IS they have to put in reasonable traffic control 
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devices to mitigate that flow. 
So in this case -- and this is not the 
most complicated application here -- so ] would say 
in this case, those parameters would be something 
along the lines of, should we require at the 
intersection of 3600 West and kind of on the west 
corner there, there would probably be a requirement 
of a four-way intersection there. And based upon the 
traffic flow that might be coming in and out of that 
area, they might take a look at requiring some sort 
of a traffic light, a four-way traffic light. 
And that would be there just to regulate 
how much flow comes onto 3600 West at any given 
moment from that subdivision. 
COMMISSIONER LLOYD: 1 see. So it's 
typically up to the City staffs' professionalism and 
experience to determine whether an applicant be 
required to do a traffic study or not. 
MR. RYAN: Yeah. If they -- if they --
COMMISSIONER LLOYD: Like Item E has been 
required obviously. That's why we've got a traffic 
study for the Catholic school. But we don't have one 
for D.R. Horton on the subdivision. 
MR. RYAN: Well, let's remember one thing 
here, this is -- we're doing a rezone here. Right? 
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We're doing a rezone here. So there is still plenty 
of time to require a traffic study for this 
application. 
COMMISSIONER LLOYD: Very good. 
MR. RYAN: And that would probably come in 
by way of a subdivision application at a later date. 
A planner will take a look at these things 
and they can intuitively gauge that a traffic study 
will be appropriate sometimes, not in other times. 
But there are nationwide standards, there are uniform 
standards in place that talk about, you know, traffic 
signal congestion and things of that affect that once 
a certain amount of flow in the nearest vicinity 
traffic signal is breached based upon those 
standards, then they have to start taking a look at 
putting in traffic signals in other area. And that's 
where your traffic studies come in. They take a look 
at how many cars are going to be at the nearest 
intersection at peak traffic times. And once it 
reaches too high of a number, they'll say, "Yep. We 
need another traffic signal away from this area to 
alleviate congestion in this area and slow the flow 
going to it." 
And that's how those things work. But --
COMMISSIONER LLOYD: Great. Thank you. 
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That's fine. 
COMMISSIONER ALLFREY: Okay. My final 
question was regarding the borders here, the two 
properties north and south of the -- the two 
subdivisions north and south having animal rights. ] 
think we heard from each of the neighbors that 
testified that animal rights seemed to be an issue 
And ] think, you know, we've had this issue come 
before us a number of times with animal rights and 
this issue of putting them maybe in -- you know, 
changing it from the RR-22, which permits it, to an 
R- 3 , that doesn't . 
Do we get any kind of account -- could we 
rely on any data that would help us determine just 
how many of these adjacent properties actually are 
using their animal rights? Is there anything there? 
Because it's a pretty big impact if we 
turn it from R-22 to R-3 if everybody around it has 
animals. I think that's a big issue. 
CITY ATTORNEY CARTER: I can appreciate 
the approach that you're trying to take in looking at 
that issue. But I think that where everybody that is 
in an RR-zoned area has animal rights, you have to 
operate on the assumption that there are going to be 
animals there. I mean, we just have to operate on 
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that assumption. Otherwise, you know, we'll be -- it 
could be that a decision you make is based on the 
idea ot , well, gee, there aren't that many horses out 
there to begin with; therefore, there is not much of 
an impact; therefore, we'll go ahead and allow this 
zoning to go through. Well, that's true today, but 
it might not be true in three months or even less 
time. 
So we have to just operate on the 
assumption of what are the permitted use rights for 
these properties and plan according to what's there, 
what they have the right to do, not what they're 
actually doing. 
COMMISSIONER ALLFREY: Okay. Thanks. 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Thank you. 
COMMISSIONER HANSEN: Mr. Chairman, I'm 
ready to make a motion. 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Thank you. 
COMMISSIONER HANSEN: I make a motion that 
we deny PL 07-4009 to rezone the third-acre lots. 
My personal opinion is that would be spot 
zoning. It's in the middle of R-22 and R-l. So I 
don't think it needs to be there. 
COMMISSIONER LLOYD: I second. 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Okay. We have a 
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mot ion 
Do ] have a second 7 
COMMISSIONER LLOYD Second. 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Mr. Lloyd 
seconds 
All those in favor 7 
COMMJSSIONE R ALLFREY: Aye. 
COMMISSIONER BROWN: Aye. 
COMMISSIONER HANSEN : Aye. 
COMMISSIONER LLOYD: Aye. 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Any opposed 7 
COMMISSIONER DENNEY: Aye, 
COMMISSION CHAIR BROWN: Okay. Motion 
carries four-to-one. 
-oOo-
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1 I P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 I 
3 THE MAYOR: Okay. We'll now move to the 
4 r ezone . 
5 And, Jason, is the presenter for staff. 
6 MR. LETHBR1DGE : Wei 1 , this is 
7 phenomenally bad timing, but 1 think due to the fact 
8 that our aircondItioning is chugging away, we appear 
9 to have blown a circuit somewhere. So it does not 
10 look like the projector is going to be cooperating 
11 for the next several minutes. 
12 And -- are your screens --
13 THE MAYOR: Our screens are gone. Here it 
14 is. I mean, the power light is out on this. Well, 
15 it flickered there. 
6 There. Now we're back on. 
7 MR. LETHBRIDGE: Your screens are on? 
8 THE MAYOR: Yeah. Yeah. 
9 I MR. LETHBRIDGE: Yeah. It's a little bit 
3 I warm in here. We'll see --
THE MAYOR: Might have blown a bulb or 
somethi ng . 
MR. LETHBRIDGE: Yeah. I'll go ahead and 
just go very briefly through the presentation. And 
then while the comments are being made, I'll see if I 
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1 can get the projector back up. ] apologize. 
2 This first item -- and let me just point 
3 out, in case there is any confusion, there are two 
4 rezones that are being proposed by D.R. Horton. One 
5 on the east side of 3600 West and the other on the 
6 west side. 
7 This first item is for the property on the 
8 east side of 3600 West. It's located at about 12175 
9 South 3600 West. And the property -- and without the 
10 presentation material, I'll try to describe a little 
11 bit better -- is - - has frontage on 3600 West and 
12 sits a little bit south of what is Jamison Drive and 
13 the cul-de-sacs that come off of that pretty. And it 
14 goes from 3600 West back east to the -- or east to 
15 t he c anal . 
6 The property is currently zoned RR-22, 
7 which is a residential zoning designation. Single 
8 family lots, with a minimum lot requirement of 
9 one-half acre. 
) I And the property does carry large animal 
r i ght s . 
The property to the north is zoned RR-22. 
The property to the south is zoned what we 
call R-1, which is single family residential, with 
one-acre lot minimum lot sizes. 
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1 To t h e e a s t , a c r o s s t h e c a n a l , i t i s z o n e d 
2 RR-17 . 
3 To the west, across 3600 West, is 
4 predominantly R-3, which is third-acre, single family 
5 zoning. 
6 The General Plan designation for the 
7 property is low density residential, which does 
8 contemplate a minimum lot size of one-third acre 
9 lots. Meaning a third of an acre is as small as the 
10 General Plan designated for this property and for 
11 this area. 
12 The requested rezone is to R-3, which 
13 again would change the property from a one-half acre 
14 minimum lot size to a one-third acre minimum lot 
15 size. 
16 The Applicant submitted -- and again, this 
17 is showing on the Council screen, and hopefully we 
18 can get it back up here in a sec -- a proposed lot 
19 layout for the property. This is submitted by them 
>0 just for conceptual purposes. All that we are 
'1 bringing before the Council tonight is a zone change. 
2 So what they have shown in terms of a conceptual 
3 layout for the property is not being approved 
4 tonight. It's simply showing that -- how they would 
5 propose to divide up the property into third-acre 
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1 lots. 
2 There is a portion of this property in the 
3 northeast corner, and it's the larger parcel shown on 
4 your drawing there, that the City has been pursuing 
5 since prior to the rezone request for a regional 
6 storm drainage facility. And so while it is 
7 certainly part of the overall picture, we have been 
8 pursuing that acquisition since prior to this request 
9 for a rezone . 
10 So we are looking at a portion of this 
11 property as a regional storm drainage facility that 
12 would include property outside of just this area. 
13 The Planning Commission, in their review 
14 of this rezone request, recommended denial of the 
15 request submitted by D.R. Horton. Essentially the 
!6 Planning Commission recommended that the property 
7 remain at its RR-22 designation. 
8 THE MAYOR: Okay. Now are there any 
9 questions from Council to staff? 
D (No verbal response.) 
1 THE MAYOR: Okay. Then we're looking for 
> I a motion to open a public hearing. 
COUNCIL MEMBER MARKUS: So moved. 
THE MAYOR: Okay. Motion made by Brad. 
COUNCIL MEMBER BRINKERHOFF: I'll second 
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the motion 
THE MAYOR: Seconded by Gayla 
Any discussion of the motion 7 
(No verbal response.) 
THE MAYOR: All in favor of the motion, 
say, "Aye 
(Chor us of "Ayes.") 
THE MAYOR: Any opposed 7 
(No verbal r esponse . ) 
THE MAYOR: So that was unanimous. 
Okay. Now we're just going to -- we're 
going to take this in segments. So this is the area 
where we're talking about currently half-acre lots. 
This is on the east side of 3600. 
Is that not correct, Jason, this is on the 
east side of 3600? 
MR. LETHBRIDGE: That's correct. And the 
slides will be up in just a sec. 
THE MAYOR: Yeah. So that's the one we're 
dealing with. 
So if you would like to make a comment on 
that, if you would come forth and just give us your 
address -- or pardon me, your name. And then if you 
would -- we will give you two minutes. 
And if someone before you has made your 
CITICOURT, LLC 
801.532.3441 
] 
2 
3 
4 
S 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
7 
8 
9 
0 
1 
point, you may want to just let that stand. Because 
the Council is interested in information that will 
help them and not the number of comments on the same 
point in that regard. 
And ] would say this to you, I'm not 
trying to set this up one way or the other, but it is 
the developer that comes in for the rezone. It is 
not the City who is presenting this. They are 
presenting it, but it's the developer's idea for the 
rezone. So the Council comes trying to gather 
information. So that's where the public comment is 
so valuable. 
So if there is anybody that would like to 
come forth, and I'm sure there will be, would you 
come up to the mic. Just give your name and then 
share any feelings that you have. 
Okay. Can't be shy in this group. We'll 
move it right along. 
MS. HESS: Giving everybody their chance. 
My name is Brenda Hess. And 1 live on 
Jamison. So I'm just north of the proposed property. 
We've been there for about 12 years. And 
when we first moved in, you know, we had fields 
around us. It was nice and quiet. It's no longer 
nice and quiet. 
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The property to the north of us was 
changed to R-3, which increased the volume down our 
street. And ] know that if we do it to the south of 
us, it's going to increase it even more because 
Janice Drive will go through and we will still have 
that increased traffic in the subdivision. 
The Planning Commission listened to our 
neighborhood when we came for their meeting and I'm 
hoping that you'll do the same, to deny it. 
Thanks. 
THE MAYOR: Thank you. 
Anyone else like to make a comment? 
MR. BALLFREY: I'm Jim Ballfrey. I live 
on Winding Creek Cove, which is part of the Midas 
Creek development. I've been there for seven years. 
It's about the fifth time I've been to a 
City Council because of the rezoning. And the main 
reason I moved out to this area was because of the 
bigger lots. 1 don't want to get this changed. I'd 
rather leave it the R-22. I don't want the more 
traffic. 
And another thing you didn't mention. Is 
Janice going to connect all the way through 
eventually on this project? If so, that's going to 
be another problem. 
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MR. L E T H B R 1 D G E : Yeah. U l t i m a t e l y , 
regardless of the density of the p r o p e r t y , t h e r e will 
be a road c o n n e c t i o n on Janice D r i v e . 
MR. B A L L F R E Y : Y e a h . T h a t ' s going to 
cause more traffic on J a n i c e , w h i c h I've got to go in 
to get to W i n d i n g C r e e k , w h i c h is m o r e t r a f f i c . A n d 
] don ' t 
THE MAYOR: Let me deal w i t h that i s s u e , 
if 1 can just a m o m e n t . 
I -- that w o r r i e s me a lot. It w o r r i e s me 
a lot when you have stub roads and they do get 
c o n n e c t e d . B e c a u s e there will be m o r e t r a f f i c . I 
m e a n , there just will be more t r a f f i c . 
But the issue of tonight is the z o n e , 
whether it be half acre or third a c r e , w h a t e v e r the 
z o n e . The issue y o u ' r e raising on t r a f f i c is a s i t e 
plan issue. And that will come back b e f o r e the 
Counc i1 aga i n. 
And J a s o n -- Jason will w o r k very hard 
with the d e v e l o p e r to look at any t r a f f i c c a l m i n g we 
can put in p l a c e and what we might do to h e l p t h a t . 
It won't solve the p r o b l e m b e c a u s e the i n c r e a s e in 
traffic will be t h e r e . 
And I have great e m p a t h y for t h a t . Not 
the current h o m e I'm in, but my first h o m e I was in 
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in River ton, we had the same thing. We had a stub 
road. And there was no traffic except those who were 
coming into our little street and going to those 
homes. And then when it gets opened up, we were then 
on a road that connected in with two other 
subdivisions and the traffic increased drastically. 
And so you're right, it will increase. 
But that is -- that has been put in place with the 
General Plan, the General Traffic Plan, or Road Plan. 
So that's in effect. And even if you had -- even if 
you put that in five-acre lots or whatever, the City 
has designated in those two parts of the street will 
be connected. 
But you're right. And so 1 would watch 
for the site plan when it comes back as well and make 
sure that we're doing all we can for traffic calming 
at that time. 
MR. BALLFREY: And again with that, Bill, 
if you're going third-acre lots, of course you're 
going to have more homes there, which means more 
traffic . 
THE MAYOR: That's correct. And that's a 
good point to make. Yeah. That is a very good 
poi nt . 
MR. BALLFREY: But to all of you. you've 
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all been voted in by the people out here. 1 hope you 
all listen to us and vote our way not to let this 
change and keep it the R-22. 
Thank you. 
THE MAYOR: Thank you. 
Any other comments on this part of it? 
MS. SNYDER: Ladies and gentlemen, thank 
you for opening this up for public debate, or 
discussion rather. 
My name is Ivey Snyder. And 1 live in 
Victoria Station, due north of the subject property. 
My concern is the traffic, which you've 
addressed, thank you very much, and the fact that it 
will increase the number of people. We're looking at 
what, approximately 300 homes between the two 
development s ? 
THE MAYOR: Would that be about right, 
Jason? 
MR. LETHBR1DGE: I'm not sure. Again, 
given where we're looking just at general density, I 
haven't touched that. 1 don't know. 
THE MAYOR: How many acres is this parcel? 
MR. LETHBRIDGE: Actually, if I could 
defer that question, we do have the Applicant here 
and he could probably give you a much more detailed 
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THE MAYOR: Okay. It would be less than 
200 . 
And worse case -- and it's on both sides 
of 36. So 36 would be the major street that would be 
impacted and you'd be right in there. Yeah. 
MS. SNYDER: Right. So we're looking at 
200 homes, 200 families, approximately 400 cars, 
unless they have teenagers. And 1 am concerned that 
3600 can't accommodate that. 
My other concern is the water. Already 
we're having trouble with water pressure. And 1 
realize that has been addressed by extending the 
amount of time we can water. 
My other concern, Sandy had this same sort 
of situation with power grids and having brown outs 
and black outs a few years ago. And they had to have 
the Army Corps of Engineers bring in generators so 
that they could have enough electricity. 
Thank you very much for letting me address 
you . 
THE MAYOR: Thank you for your comments. 
Any other comments on this part of the 
rezone -- or on this rezone? 
(No verbal response.) 
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THE MAYOR: Okay. Seeing none, we'd look 
for a motion to close the public hearing. 
MR. LETHBR1DGE: Mayor, point of 
information. 
The Applicant has not yet been invited to 
speak. Perhaps he would at this time. 
THE MAYOR: Pardon me? 
MR. LETHBRIDGE: The Applicant has not yet 
spoken. ] think they were waiting for the right 
oppo r t un i t y. 
Would you like to speak now? 
MR. MARTIN: Yes. 
THE MAYOR: Yeah. Let's -- let's close 
the public hearing and then we'll give you a chance 
to speak as the Applicant. 
Are we okay with 
COUNCIL MEMBER LEAVITT: I'll move it, 
Mayor. 
THE MAYOR: Okay. A motion made by Al . 
Is there a second? 
COUNCIL MEMBER BENTSON: I'll second that 
THE MAYOR: Seconded by Carma. 
Any discussion to it? 
(No verbal response.) 
THE MAYOR: All in favor of the motion 
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say, "Ay e. " 
(Chorus of "Ayes.") 
THE MAYOR: Any opposed 7 
(No verbal re sponse . ) 
THE MAYOR: Okay. Now let's have the 
applicant come forward then and address anything that 
he would like to to the Council. And the Council can 
ask him any questions that they would 1 like to. 
MR. MARTIN: Thanks for your time. 
Boyd Martin, Division President, for D R . 
Hor ton Homes. 
Just a few comments on this property here. 
Obviously we are going for the R-3. We've 
got R-4s kitty-corner to that. Across the street 
there, it is zoned R-3. It doesn't affect the 
appraisals at all. If you look at how they do 
appraisals at this point, they wouldn't pull comps 
off this. They'd pull comps across the street and so 
forth. So as far as any values of homes, it wouldn't 
c hange those at all. 
Traffic, yes. It is a concern. But 
that's handled in the traffic study. And we review 
that. We probably will end up widening the road. 
It's a major collector road as it is. 
I think with R-22s, you probably get 15 
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1 lots in there, maybe 16, off the top of my h e a d . ] 
2 haven't laid that out So I'm just g u e s s t I m a t i n g . 
3 We've got 38 homes on this one. So you more than 
4 d o u b l e it with the R- 13s . 
5 Let me just clarify on the l o t s , 1 ran a 
6 rough c a l c u l a t i o n . W o r s e c a s e , Mayor and C o u n c i l , is 
7 154 lots if we - - you take the 38 on this side p l u s 
8 the -- oh, e x c u s e me h e r e , roughly 116 on the o t h e r 
9 s i d e , a s s u m i n g you get the R M - 8 . So 154 total h o m e s 
10 on t h e i r , w o r s e case s c e n a r i o . 
11 Other than that, 1 know that we are 
1? w o r k i n g very c l o s e l y with the city. If we do do this 
13 p r o j e c t on w o r k i n g on the d e t e n t i o n b a s e and g e t t i n g 
14 that in, that you guys are looking f o r . 
15 W e ' r e just e x c i t e d to c o n t i n u e b u i l d i n g 
16 g o o d , q u a l i t y homes in R i v e r t o n . 
[7 So a p p r e c i a t e your time. 
.8 THE MAYOR: Thank y o u . Any q u e s t i o n from 
9 C o u n c i1? 
0 U N I D E N T I F I E D M A L E : Just for J a s o n . 
1 S h o w us w h e r e that d e t e n t i o n basin is 
2 p l a n n e d . Right h e r e ? 
3 MR. L E T H B R I D G E : This is the area for the 
4 p r o p o s e d d e t e n t i o n b a s i n . So it w o u l d sit up a g a i n s t 
5 the c a n a l , a g a i n kind of in that n o r t h e a s t c o r n e r . 
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UNIDENTIFIED MALE A regional; isn't it 7 
MR. LETHBR1DGE: Yes. So it's not simply 
to accommodate the drainage for this proposed 
project. It would take in a much broader area. 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Has that been donated 
to the City or are we buying it? 
MR. LETHBR1DGE: Right now ] believe we're 
still in negotiations to purchase it. 
But donation of the property was an issue 
raised by the Applicant as part of their proposal. 
But our Engineering Department has been pursuing 
negotiation for purchase. 
THE MAYOR: Why would they -- we're not 
getting -- by "donating" -- and let's clarify this 
before we leave kind of a cloud here. 
We're not trying to trade density for a 
detention pond? 
MR. LETHBR1DGE: No. That's not been 
anything brought forward by staff or even suggested 
up to this point. So 1 know there has been a little 
confusion on that from some of the public comment 
we've recei ved . 
THE MAYOR: Yeah. This is -- the 
detention pond appears to be needed from engineering, 
from our Regional Storm Water Plan. And we should 
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buy that land when we -- whatever develops in there 
because we need it to control the water. And so 
either way, but -- so the Council is making a 
decision on the zoning issue for what they feel is 
the best zone to put in. Yeah. Okay. 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I have a question, 
Jason. 
On that map, that little white piece on 
the bottom of the map that runs north/south, that is 
the canal; is that correct? And it runs all the way 
along, so the canal actually separates the R-4 from 
the R- 22 ; is that correct? 
MR. LETHBR1DGE: Yes. So the red line 
that 1 drew along the map, that is the canal there. 
So there is a separation between the R-4 to the east 
and this proposed project. 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: And there is no bridge 
or connection that connects that R-4 to the R-22? 
MR. LETHBR1DGE: There is not. 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Thank you. 
MR. LETHBRIDGE: And nor would there be 
one proposed as part of any development along here. 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Thank you. 
THE MAYOR: Okay. Any other questions 
f rom Counci1? 
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(No verbal response.) 
THE MAYOR: Okay. Council, then we would 
turn to you to how you might want to deal with this. 
COUNCIL MEMBER MARKUS: ] make a motion 
that we deny PL Number 07-4009, a request for the 
rezoning of property at 12175 5outh 3600 West from 
RR-22 to R-3. 
COUNCIL MEMBER TINGEY: I'll second it. 
THE MAYOR: Okay. That motion was made by 
Brad. Seconded by Roy. 
Any discussion to the motion? 
(No verbal response.) 
THE MAYOR: All in favor of the motion 
say, "Aye." 
(Chorus of "Ayes.") 
THE MAYOR: Any opposed? 
(No verbal response.) 
THE MAYOR: Okay. So that's unanimous. 
So that zone stays as half-acre zones so 
that -- so that you're --
(Applause . ) 
THE MAYOR: Now. Now. Now. Now. We had 
a previous mayor that would hit the gavel when those 
kinds of things happened. 
-oOo-
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REPORTER ' S CERT] F K A T E 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss 
) 
] , Kelly Fine-Jensen, Registered 
Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and 
the State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
for 
That on November 10, 2007, 
CD at the request of Riverton City; 
1 t r ansc r i bed a 
That the testimony of all speakers was 
reported by me in stenotype and thereafter 
transcribed, and that a full, true, and correct 
transcription of said testimony is set forth in the 
preceding pages, according to my ability to hear and 
understand the tape provided. 
I further certify that 1 am not kin or 
otherwise associated with any of the parties to said 
cause of action and that 1 am not interested in the 
outcome thereof. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND 
13th day of November, 2007. 
OFFICIAL SEAL this 
KELLY FINE JENSEN 
NOTARY PUBLIC • STAJT OF UTAH 
64? HARRISON AVE. 
SAIT LAKE CITY Ul 84)05 
My Comm. Exp. 07/25/2010 
KEdY-TTflr-JENSEN, RPR 
Notary Pub l i c 
Resid ing i n S a l t Lake County 
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Exhibit E 
JODY K BURNETT (0499) 
ROBERT C. KELLER (4861) 
WILLIAMS & H U N T 
Attorneys for Respondent Riverton City 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
Salt Lake City Utah 84145-5678 
Phone (801) 521-5678 
Facsimile (801) 364-4500 
jburnett (ffiwilhunt.com 
rkeller(ffiwilhunt..com 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of Application PLZ-07-4009: 
Willis Lauritz Petersen, Jr., Leslee P. : SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
Christensen, Allan D. Petersen, Kristine Petersen : ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Smith, and Dean B. Petersen, as trustees of the : 
Margarett Park Petersen Family Living Trust, : 
Petitioners, : Case No. 070911432 
v. : Judge Anthony Quinn 
Riverton City, : 
Respondent. : 
This matter came before the above-entitled Court on December 4, 2008, the 
Honorable Anthony Quinn presiding, for a hearing on respondent Riverton City's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Petitioners were represented by Dale E Gardiner. Respondent 
Riverton City was represented by Jody K Burnett. 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 2 9 2008 
SALT LAKE COUNTY* j y l 
Deputy Clerk 
The Court having reviewed the legal memoranda and exhibits submitted by the 
parties and having considered the arguments of counsel, issued its ruling from the bench 
following the conclusion of the hearing on December 4, 2008. Pursuant to that ruling, 
respondent Riverton City's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted on the basis 
that the Court finds there are no genuine issues as to any material facts and that the City is 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. As grounds in support of its decision, 
the Court notes that it has a very limited role in reviewing this challenge to the exercise of 
legislative discretion by the Riverton City Council on a petition for review which is subject 
to the highly deferential, reasonably debatable standard. The Court can only consider the 
record of proceedings before the City which has been provided by the City pursuant to 
section 10-9a-801, and it is not appropriate to permit discovery under these facts and 
circumstances. The record of proceedings indicates that the application to rezone the 
property was consistent with the general plan, but so is the existing zoning. In addition, 
the property in question is surrounded on three sides by similarly zoned property. 
Pursuant to the Court's ruling, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED as follows: 
1. Respondent Riverton City's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
GRANTED, and the Petition is hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice and upon the merits. 
All parties are to bear their own respective costs and attorney's fees. 
2. The petitioners' Motion for Continuance Pursuant to Rule 56(f) is hereby 
denied on the basis that, as noted above, the Court's review is limited to the record under 
Utah law and therefore discoveiy is not appropriate under these facts and circumstances. 
3. The petitioners' Motion for Consolidation has been rendered moot by 
removal of the later filed action which is the subject of that motion to Federal Court and 
this Order. 
4. This constitutes the final order of the Court disposing all of the issues raised 
by the Petition and related motions that have been filed in this matter. . 
J* 
DATED this ^ 7 day of December, 2008. 
BY THE C e O T E F ^ 
Dale F. Gardiner 
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Shari H. Sampson, being duly sworn, says that she is employed in the law offices of 
Williams & Hunt, attorneys for respondent City of Riverton herein; that she served the 
attached proposed SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL in Case No. 
070911432 before the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Counsel for Petitioners 
Dale F. Gardiner 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
36 S. State St., Suite 1900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on die 22nd day of 
December, 2008. 
%&<2l^flc&Ltkft§r> 
Shari H. Sampson 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 22nd day of December, 2008. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
M N i m A . l V O N 
js reMotswMMO 
( 1 1 . -
STATEOfUTAM 
Notaryrublic 
